
DO NOT COVER

(Use letterhead of the command or State IG headquarters)

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL SOLDIERS AT (INSTALLATION OR ORGANIZATION)

SUBJECT: Right of Soldiers to Present Complaints to or Request Assistance from the Inspector General

1. All soldiers have the right to present complaints, grievances, or requests for assistance to the inspector general. These may include what soldiers reasonably believe evidences fraud, waste, and abuse.
2. Before visiting the inspector general, you should consider whether your concerns can be addressed more quickly and simply by referring them to your chain of command. You do not have to present your concerns to your chain of command before visiting the inspector general. However, you must obtain permission to be absent from your duties if you wish to visit the inspector general during your duty hours. You do not have to tell anyone why you want to speak with an IG.
3. You may visit, call, or write your local inspector general at--

NAME:

OFFICE HOURS:

ROOM:

ADDRESS:

TELEPHONE:

4. If you believe your local inspector general's response to you is not fair, complete, or in accordance with law and regulation; or if you believe your interests may be jeopardized by contacting your local inspector general, you may write to (give address of IG at appropriate HQ). You may also call the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) or the Inspector General, Department of Defense (IG, DOD) Hotline. Their telephone numbers are--

DAIG: Toll free: 1-800-752-9747

IG, DOD: Toll free: 1-800-424-9098,

Commercial: (703)-693-5080, DSN: 223-5080

Figure 4-1 (PAGE 1). Sample permanent notice memorandum of rights of soldiers to present complaints

5. Department of the Army personnel are prohibited from taking any action that restricts you from filing a complaint, seeking assistance, or cooperating with the inspector general, or a member of Congress. They are also prohibited from taking any disciplinary or adverse action against you for filing a complaint, seeking assistance, or cooperating with the inspector general, a member of Congress or any agency established to receive such complaints. However, if you lie or knowingly make false accusations to the inspector general, you are subject to disciplinary action.

6. Per AR 20-1, paragraph 1-12, the IG has a duty to protect confidentiality to the maximum extent possible. This is true for all persons who ask the IG for help, make a complaint, give evidence, contact or assist an IG during an inspection or investigation, or otherwise interact with an IG.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/S/

JOHN S. JONES

Captain, IN

Adjutant

Figure 4-1 (PAGE 2). Sample permanent notice memorandum of rights of soldiers to present complaints—Continued

DO NOT COVER

(Use letterhead of the detailed IG headquarters)

MEMORANDUM FOR CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AT (INSTALLATION OR ORGANIZATION)

SUBJECT: Right of Civilian Employees to Present Complaints to or Request Assistance from the Inspector General

1. All civilian employees have the right to present complaints, grievances, or requests for assistance to the inspector general. These may include what the civilian employee reasonably believes evidences fraud, waste, and abuse.
2. Before visiting the inspector general, you should consider whether your concerns can be addressed more quickly and simply by referring them to your immediate supervisor first, or by using one of the procedures in paragraph 3.
3. Civilian Personnel Regulations prescribe procedures for civilian employees to use in submitting complaints that pertain solely to civilian employment matters. These include complaints on such personnel actions as reductions-in-force, removals, disciplinary measures, and similar actions. If you want to submit this kind of complaint, contact (name and address of local civilian personnel officer) who will give you information about the pertinent regulations and tell you the procedures to follow. However, if you are a member of a recognized bargaining unit and there is a negotiated grievance procedure, you must file your complaints concerning employment matters by following that procedure. If you want to submit a complaint about discrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, or handicap condition, contact (name and address of Equal Employment Opportunity Officer).
4. If you have a complaint about matters other than civilian employment, or a complaint about violations of regulations or procedures in processing complaints about personnel actions, and you feel your complaint has not been resolved by your supervisor, you may visit, call, or write your local inspector general at--

NAME:

OFFICE HOURS:

ROOM:

ADDRESS:

TELEPHONE:

Figure 4-2 (PAGE 1). Sample permanent notice memorandum of rights of civilians to present complaints

5. If you believe your local inspector general's response to you is not fair, complete, or in accordance with law and regulation; or if you believe your interests may be jeopardized by contacting your local inspector general, you may write to (give address of IG at appropriate HQ). You may also call the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) or the Inspector General, Department of Defense (IG,DOD) Hotline. Their telephone numbers are--

DAIG: Toll free: 1-800-752-9747

IG, DOD: Toll free: 1-800-424-9098,

Commercial: (703)-693-5080, DSN: 223-5080

6. You may report complaints about hazardous work conditions (unsafe or unhealthy) by using procedures in chapter 3, AR 385-10.

7. Per AR 20-1, paragraph 1-12, the IG has a duty to protect confidentiality to the maximum extent possible. This is true for all persons who ask the IG for help, make a complaint, give evidence, contact or assist an IG during an inspection or investigation, or otherwise interact with an IG.

8. Department of the Army personnel are prohibited from taking any action that restricts you from filing a complaint, seeking assistance, or cooperating with the inspector general, or a member of Congress. They are also prohibited from taking any disciplinary or adverse action against you for filing a complaint, seeking assistance, or cooperating with the inspector general, a member of Congress or any agency established to receive such complaints. However, if you lie or knowingly make false accusations to the inspector general, you are subject to disciplinary action.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/S/

JOHN S. JONES

Captain, IN

Adjutant

Figure 4-2 (PAGE 2). Sample permanent notice memorandum of rights of civilians to present complaints—Continued

Chapter 5 The Inspector General Teaching and Training Function

5-1. Inspector general training

Since the time of George Washington's IG, Major General von Steuben, training has been an essential part of all IG activities. While IGs are no longer the primary trainers of soldiers, as General von Steuben was during the American Revolution, they possess a reservoir of experience and knowledge to assist commanders in achieving disciplined and combat-ready units.

5-2. Teaching and training

The IGs teach skills; provide information about Army systems, processes, and procedures; and assess attitudes while assisting, inspecting, and investigating. Through their example, IGs assist commanders in setting standards of behavior and appearance. Inspectors general pass on lessons learned to enable others to benefit from past experience. The IG teaching and training function is an integral part of the other IG functions of inspecting, assisting and investigating.

5-3. Training the Army at large

The IGs have a responsibility to train non-IGs on how the IG System operates and on specific standards, responsibilities, processes, and systems related to non-IG activities.

a. *IG System.* The effectiveness of the IG System is, to a great extent, a function of how receptive non-IGs are to the IG System. Therefore, IGs must teach leaders and their soldiers how IGs contribute to mission accomplishment and search for opportunities to inform them of the IG System's purpose, functions, methods, benefits, and constraints. The IG involvement in pre-command courses, officer professional development, the NCO Development Program, newcomer briefings, and other activities helps to explain the IG system to the Army at large. Failure to explain the IG concepts to commanders and others may result in the misuse of IGs.

b. *Other matters.* While inspecting, assisting, or investigating, IGs contribute to improving the Army by teaching and training others in policy and procedures.

(1) During periods of organizational change and quick operational pace, soldiers and their leaders may lack a complete understanding of required Army standards and procedures. Historically, IGs have trained soldiers and leaders on standards and procedures. This function has changed little since the American Revolution.

(2) Since IGs are selected based on their experience, they should possess valuable knowledge, experience, and insight that many non-IGs lack. Their knowledge of the Army increases through their training, experience as an IG, and the extensive research that IG duties require. The IGs gain a broad perspective on the Army that few other soldiers attain.

(3) Inspectors general incorporate teaching and training into all aspects of their duties. When inspectors notice that inspected personnel do not know regulatory requirements, they explain the requirements and the reason they were established. Additionally, IGs are able to pass on lessons learned and "good ideas" or benchmarks observed during other inspections.

5-4. Inspector General Course

The USAIGA's Training Division conducts a resident course for qualifying detailed and assistant IGs on IG standards, responsibilities, doctrine, and techniques.

a. *Candidates.* Army candidates for this course must be selected and approved through the IG certification process (see para 2-3 and app C). Army administrative support personnel, acting IGs, and IGs from other Services may attend the resident course on a space-available basis.

b. *Graduates.* Graduates of the USAIGA's resident IG Course are considered to be fully qualified to assume IG duties at the appropriate command level. However, these personnel may not master IG techniques until they have gained practical, on-the-job experience.

c. *Instructors.* The USAIGA instructors are normally experienced IGs who have served at DAIG or elsewhere in the IG System. These instructors also write course materials, policy and doctrinal publications, and prepare export training packages.

d. *Course curriculum.* The USAIGA's resident IG Course provides comprehensive instruction and training on the IG role and the four basic IG functions. Instruction is also provided on a myriad of other IG related topics with much of the training taking place in small group practical exercises.

e. *Requirements.*

(1) Graduation from the IG Course is a requirement for all detailed and assistant IGs and for temporary assistant IGs serving longer than 180 days. All IGs, except for RC M-day and TPU soldiers, will graduate from the course before assuming their duties. Reserve Components M-day and TPU soldiers will attend and graduate from the IG Course as

soon as possible after being appointed as detailed or assistant IGs. Inspector general functions will not be performed until the soldier completes the certification process except as specified in paragraph 2-2e. Soldiers who have previously served as an IG and are approved by TIG for a repetitive IG detail will attend the IG Course unless the requirement is waived by Chief, Training Division, USAIGA. Waivers are granted on a case-by-case basis, considering such factors as previous IG experience, projected IG assignment, and recent changes in IG policy, procedures, and issues.

(2) Requirements for graduation from IG School courses are determined by Chief, Training Division, USAIGA. The Deputy TIG (DTIG) is delegated the authority to approve or disapprove the graduation of all IG School students and the issuance of a certificate of training. TIG serves as the appellate authority for students who fail to successfully graduate from IG School courses.

f. Requests for attendance. USAIGA's Training Division will maintain a schedule of IG Course and Site Administration Course classes, forecasting a 12-month period. Requests for quotas for these courses are approved by the Chief, Training Division. Quota requests will be coordinated as follows:

(1) *Active Army.* Requests for course quotas for Active Army soldiers and DA civilians will be submitted by IG offices, or PERSCOM, to USAIGA's Training Division after the IG's nomination is approved by proper authority. (See para 2-3.)

(2) *ARNGUS.* Requests for course quotas for ARNGUS personnel will be submitted by the State AG or a designated representative of the AG, and the NGB, directly to USAIGA's Training Division after the IG's nomination is approved by proper authority. (See para 2-3.)

(3) *USAR.* Requests for course quotas for USAR personnel will be submitted by IG offices or AR-PERSCOM directly to USAIGA's Training Division after the IG's nomination is approved by proper authority. (See para 2-3.)

(4) *Sustainment training.* Inspectors general who have not completed the IG Course or DAIG sustainment training within the past 5 years will enroll in a DAIG sustainment training course within 3 months of their 5-year anniversary. Requests for sustainment training will be coordinated with DAIG Training Division.

g. Funding.

(1) Funding for attendance of detailed and assistant IGs at the resident IG Course is provided through a variety of sources. Coordination for and questions pertaining to funding for a specific student should be addressed to Training Division, USAIGA, when a quota for the course is requested. Funding for acting IGs, temporary assistant IGs (except those serving longer than 180 days who must attend the IG Course), and administrative support staff will be provided by the command to which the individual is assigned.

(2) The DAIG provides funding for training for the following students (locally nominated IGs) attending the IG Course, temporary duty (TDY) and return. If commanders request early curtailment of the IG detail, TIG may approve the request contingent upon the commander funding the training costs for the replacement IG.

(a) Active Army military and civilian IGs.

(b) ARNGUS AGR IGs.

h. Additional skill identifier/special qualifications identifiers. Award of the additional skill identifier (ASI) 5N to commissioned officers and special qualifications identifier (SQI) B to noncommissioned officers is authorized upon successful graduation from the resident IG Course. The IG's local military personnel office (MILPO) will award the official ASI 5N to officers and the SQI B to noncommissioned officers upon receipt of a course completion letter prepared by USAIGA's Training Division.

5-5. Other IG School courses and POI

a. IGMET Site Administrator Course. The Site Administrator Course provides system administrators with basic knowledge of the IGMET computer system and the ability to perform administrative functions using various software applications. The course is available to system administrators and assistant system administrators responsible for maintaining the IGMET computer system.

b. State IG module. The State IG module is a 3-day supplement to the standard IG Course that is required training for all State IGs. It is offered as optional training to all other Active Army personnel assigned as IGs in the ARNGUS.

c. Sustainment training. The IG School conducts sustainment training for IGs who have not received DAIG training for 5 or more consecutive years as an IG. A resident refresher course is currently conducted semiannually. Requests for attendance should be made directly to DAIG Training Division. Additional exportable training packages are also available from the Training Division.

5-6. Training acting inspectors general, temporary assistant inspectors general and administrative support staff

Limited resources prevent all categories of IGs from attending the IG resident courses. Therefore, acting IGs, temporary assistant IGs (with duty less than 180 days), and administrative support staff are trained locally by command and State IGs. Training for IGs should reflect TIG doctrine as promulgated through the resident IG Course. The USAIGA's Training Division creates and maintains programs of instruction (POIs) and exportable training packages for training IGs. These materials may be tailored to meet the needs of the local command.

a. *POI for nonresident training.* USAIGA's Training Division prepares a POI for command and State IGs to use in training acting IGs and administrative support staff. The POI is distributed to MACOM IG offices.

b. *POI for temporary assistant IGs.* Training programs for temporary assistant IGs, which are designed to prepare them for a particular inspection or other IG function, do not need to be submitted to DAIG for approval. Temporary assistant IGs will be trained in such matters as confidentiality, root cause analysis, teaching and training, and protection of IG records, as applicable to their IG duties.

c. *Other POIs.* Command and State IGs may conduct short IG training courses considered necessary to sustain understanding of new doctrine, procedures, or policies. To ensure standardization, POIs for such courses will be submitted to DAIG Training Division for approval prior to being used. (Training Division is a valuable resource for IGs who conduct IG training.)

5-7. Nuclear weapons and chemical surety technical inspector qualifications training

a. *Training program.* Officers, WOs, and civilian employees assigned to conduct technical inspections will undergo the following three-phase training program:

(1) Phase I: IG Course.

(2) Phase II: A technical training course conducted by either the Ordnance Missile and Munitions Center and School, Redstone Arsenal, AL; the Defense Ammunition Center, McAlester, OK; or similar activities approved by the DAIG Technical Inspections Division.

(3) Phase III: An on-the-job training (OJT) program. The training program must—

(a) Thoroughly familiarize the inspector with standardized current policies and procedures of the technical inspection system.

(b) Provide newly assigned inspectors the opportunity to observe at least two technical inspections before conducting an inspection.

(c) Provide a means of updating the chemical surety systems training for inspectors.

b. *Exceptions.* Requests for exceptions to the provisions of this paragraph will be forwarded to DAIG Technical Inspections Division (SAIG-TI).

Chapter 6

The Inspector General Inspection Function

Section I

Inspection Functions

6-1. Functional systems

a. Army leaders continually assess their organizations to determine the organization's capability to accomplish its wartime and peacetime missions. They accomplish this by analyzing and correlating evaluations of various functional systems such as training, logistics, personnel, resource management, force integration, and intelligence oversight.

b. FM 25-100 describes this assessment as a mental process that takes information from multiple evaluation sources (such as personal observation, inspection reports, after-action reviews, and training results) and determines the organization's strengths and weaknesses. An IG inspection is one of the many sources of information available to the commander.

c. The IG inspection function is the process of conducting IG inspections, developing and implementing IG inspection programs, oversight of intelligence activities, and participation in the Organizational Inspection Program (OIP).

6-2. The role of the inspector general in the OIP

a. The IGs will develop their IG inspection program as part of the OIP, in accordance with the commander's guidance.

b. AR 1-201 prescribes policy and responsibilities for the conduct of inspections in Army organizations. Inspectors general have the following responsibilities regarding the OIP:

(1) Advise commanders and staffs on inspection policy.

(2) Advise the commander on the effectiveness of the OIP.

(3) Conduct IG inspections per AR 1-201 and this regulation.

c. Detailed instructions for preparing, executing, and completing IG inspections are contained in paragraph 6-4. Inspectors general will consider the IG inspection process shown at figure 6-2 when planning, executing, and completing any IG inspection. This ensures a methodical, thorough process is consistently applied across the IG system when preparing, executing, and completing IG inspections. The inspection may still be tailored to meet the commander's needs, while preserving the integrity of the IG inspection process across the Army.

d. Inspector general technical inspections of organizations with nuclear and chemical missions are addressed in section II of this chapter.

e. Inspector general intelligence oversight inspections of intelligence activities are addressed in section III of this chapter.

6-3. Inspector general inspection policy

a. Inspectors general will conduct a deliberate process to identify, evaluate, and set priorities for potential inspections to be included in the IG inspection program. A recommended process for inspection selection is at figure 6-1.

(1) There are many ways to identify possible topics for inspections; commander's guidance, the mission essential task list (METL), IGAR trend analysis, input from functional staff proponents, quarterly training briefs, unit status reports, results of sensing sessions, installation newspapers, and the results of previous inspections are but a few possible sources.

(2) The goal is to develop a manageable number of key, high payoff inspection topics that are achievable by the IG.

(3) Once the commander has approved the topics for inspection, the IG will ensure that the inspections are reflected on the appropriate training and planning calendars.

b. Inspector general inspections may focus on either organizations, systems, or both. Inspections that focus on organizations or units and are comprehensive are considered general inspections. Inspections that focus on specific programs, systems or functional areas are considered special inspections. Normally, the preferred focus for IG inspections is on systems using the special inspection, since command and staff inspections are usually focused on organizations. The payoff derived from systemic inspections generally has a broader application within the directing authority's organization.

c. Inspector general inspections will—

(1) Identify noncompliance, determine the magnitude of the deficiency, and seek the root cause.

(2) Pursue systemic issues.

(3) Teach systems, processes, and procedures.

(4) Identify responsibility for corrective action.

(5) Spread innovative ideas.

(6) Train those inspected and, as appropriate, those conducting the inspection.

d. Inspectors general must analyze indicators of significant problems and plan inspections that will provide timely feedback and recommended corrections to appropriate decision-makers. This planning and analysis will ensure that an IG's inspection resources are employed in areas that provide the highest payoff to the commander and the Army. The planning and analysis process must result in a list of subject priorities for future inspections.

(1) When scheduling IG inspections, follow the principles and procedures presented in FM 25-100.

(2) The commander may decide to redirect the command's inspection effort. Unanticipated events may cause the commander to deviate from the published inspection plan by rescheduling planned inspections or to initiate an unscheduled, high-priority inspection.

e. Inspectors general must tailor inspections to meet their commander's needs. Inspections must be relevant, reliable, and responsive. To be relevant, inspections must provide practical, accurate feedback in time for the commander and staff to make informed decisions. To be reliable, the observations and findings must reflect what is actually occurring in the inspected unit, activity, or system. To be responsive, results must be provided as the inspection progresses so that appropriate fixes can be made or initiated. Depending on the nature of the inspection, some findings that are not critical or perishable may be held until the inspection is completed. Inspection results go directly to the commander, the staff, or subordinate commanders, as appropriate.

f. Deficiencies identified in an IG inspection will be subject to followup after a reasonable time for corrective action. It is preferable to conduct followup by inspection, phone call, or some other means rather than to require a reply by endorsement (RBE) to determine if appropriate corrective action has been implemented. An RBE is not normally required for IG inspections.

g. Inspector general inspection results will not be used to compare units, organizations, or as criteria for unit competitive awards. Inspector general inspections are not designed to reward or penalize units, commanders, or individuals.

h. Protecting the anonymity of units and individuals enhances the IG's reputation as a team player and trusted agent. While confidentiality is a priority concern, IGs will not promise confidentiality during an inspection. There are occasions when IGs must identify the source of their information or units inspected in order to fix problems or to ensure assistance is provided. In those instances, IGs must inform the individuals or unit commanders that identities will be revealed in the inspection report and explain why such action is necessary. This will help to maintain credibility in the IG system as being forthright in actions taken.

i. If an IG discovers serious deficiencies involving breaches of integrity, security violations, or criminality, the IG should consult with the supporting SJA, USACIDC, or provost marshal as appropriate to determine their recommended course of action. The IG may inform the commander directing the inspection of the SJA's, USACIDC's, or provost

marshal's recommended course of action, or the IG may choose to initiate an investigative inquiry. The IG will notify the appropriate subordinate commander so that immediate corrective actions can be implemented.

j. Inspectors general are authorized to conduct inspections of any Army unit assigned within the command. Inspectors general may inspect units of another command, so long as coordination and prior approval have been effected at the appropriate command level. For example, prior to conducting an IG inspection of a tenant unit assigned to another MACOM, the inspecting IG must coordinate with the appropriate MACOM IG. Outside continental United States (OCONUS) MACOM IGs, with prior approval, may inspect another MACOM's activities located within their geographic area. Installation IGs may inspect tenant activities, including Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) facilities and DOD activities, resident on the installation once coordinated and approved.

k. An IG may participate as a member of another command's IG inspection team.

l. An IG may not participate in a command inspection as the head of the inspection team or participate in a command inspection other than to inspect IG functions and IG areas of responsibility. This prohibition also applies to any staff inspection. An IG may participate as a member of a command inspection team for the purpose of inspecting a subordinate command IG office or to execute Intelligence Oversight or Organizational Inspection Program responsibilities. For example, a corps commander may decide to conduct a command inspection of a subordinate division. The corps IG may inspect the division IG as a part of the command inspection team. Although accompanying the rest of the command inspection team, the IG will be conducting an IG inspection. The results of the corps IG's inspection will be protected as IG records (see chap 3) and will be provided under separate cover to the inspecting commander; the results will not be included as a part of the overall command inspection report.

m. Any inspection conducted by an IG as a part of a command or staff inspection renders that part of the command or staff inspection an IG inspection. This does not preclude the IG from teaching and training a command or staff inspection team on how to conduct inspections, nor does it preclude the IG from accompanying either of those teams to observe and evaluate the inspection and the inspectors. In these instances, the IG will only provide findings that reflect the result of inspecting the inspectors and the inspection.

n. Inspectors general may conduct a sensing session or a command climate survey as a part of a command or staff inspection but must publish and disseminate the results separately as IG records in accordance with chapter 3. It is recommended that other staff proponents such as the EO advisor, chaplain, or EEO conduct sensing sessions during command or staff inspections. Command climate surveys should be conducted by the personnel staff proponent; the proponent for DA Pam 600-69, Unit Climate Profile Commander's Handbook, is HQDA, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER). When conducting sensing sessions involving DOD civilian personnel, it may be necessary to coordinate the sessions with the local bargaining unit/union.

6-4. Inspector general inspection process

a. Preparation phase.

(1) Research. The purpose of the research sub-phase is to narrow the scope and focus of the inspection and to identify the high payoff items.

(2) Develop the concept. This is the blueprint of the inspection plan. The inspection concept also; assists in the preparation of the decision briefing for the commander, helps develop the initial notification letter to the commands involved in the inspection, and is the basis for preparation of the detailed inspection plan and the in-brief for the units to be inspected.

(3) Commander approves the concept. This is a decision briefing or paper for the directing authority. The end result is a directive signed by the directing authority approving the scope, methodology and objectives of the inspection.

(4) Plan in detail. After the directing authority has approved the inspection, the specific details about the inspection are determined, to include individual inspector and team inspection schedules, units to be inspected, exact dates of the inspection, focus of the inspection, and special needs such as facilities, documents, guides, or equipment and other details as required. The final product will be the detailed notification letter to the commands involved in the inspection. Both the initial and the detailed notification letter should be given the widest possible distribution; as a minimum, both letters must be given to the units to be inspected.

(5) Pre-inspection visits. These visits are used to validate your detailed plan. Normally, units selected for the pre-inspection visit are not chosen for the actual inspection. The pre-inspection visit is a training device for the IG inspection team; the results of the visit are left with the unit commander and are not normally reflected in the inspection report. Exceptions to this principle are at the discretion of the command or State IG.

(6) Train up. This is the step where individual inspectors are trained in the standards, methodology, and other technical details of the inspection. If augmentees (temporary assistant IGs) have been added to the team, they must also be trained on the provisions of AR 1-201 and AR 20-1, then administered the IG oath as members of the IG inspection team.

b. Execution phase.

(1) *Visit units.* This is the sub-phase where the IG actually inspects the units previously selected. When conducting the inspection, IGs must consider conducting an assistance session in conjunction with the inspection; in some cases,

this may be the only opportunity the members of the inspected command have to personally present issues and complaints to an IG.

(2) *In-Process review.* Although shown only once in figure 6-2, in-process reviews (IPRs) can be conducted at any point in the inspection process. The main purpose of the IPR is to share information amongst inspectors. Other uses include refocusing, redirecting, or reorganizing the inspection based upon the emerging findings. Suggested IPRs include an IPR during the detailed planning sub-phase; a train up IPR; an IPR at the end of the execution phase; and a report writing IPR. Inspectors general should consider conducting an IPR at the end of each day during the actual inspection; some of the information uncovered could be perishable and require immediate action. A daily IPR helps the inspection team determine the best way to proceed.

(3) *Updating the commander.* Inspectors general must consider when and how to update the directing authority during the inspection, or if an update is required. The duration and complexity of the inspection, as well as emerging and verified findings, are key considerations.

(4) *Analyzing results and crosswalking.* When analyzing the results of the inspection, IGs look for patterns and trends, using their experience and judgment to identify systemic issues and determine root causes. The purpose of the crosswalk is to pursue leads and to verify or refute issues.

(5) *Outbrief the proponents.* Proponents are those who resolve problems in their area of responsibility found during the inspection. Inspectors general brief proponents on the findings so that the proponents can begin fixing the problem. By briefing the proponents the IG may also learn more about the problem. This should be done as soon as a finding is made and not held until the end of the inspection.

c. Completion phase.

(1) *Outbrief the commander.* This is the step where the IG presents the results of the inspection to the directing authority. The proponents are normally invited to attend this briefing.

(2) *Taskers.* Taskers are the IG's recommendations contained in the inspection report. Once the commander approves the IG report of inspection, those recommendations are translated into taskings to the proponents to fix the problems identified in the report.

(3) *Final report.* The final report usually consists of a cover letter, an executive summary, and the findings. Minimally, the final report will consist of a cover letter signed by the commander or designated representative and the findings. The report will be protected as described in chapter 3.

(4) *Handing off.* The transferring of a verified finding that is beyond the ability or authority of the command to correct. Verified findings are the findings in the IG inspection report approved by the directing authority. These are really the recommendations approved by the commander. It can be sent through either command or IG channels.

(5) *Distributing the final report.* The final report should be given the widest possible dissemination following the provisions in chapter 3. This helps to ensure that all elements of the command are aware of the results of the inspection and can apply corrective action where appropriate even though not all elements were inspected. At a minimum, the units inspected will receive a copy of the final report.

(6) *Schedule followup.* A followup can take many forms, from a telephone call to another inspection. Followup closes the loop with all concerned, identifies what got fixed, what still needs to be fixed, and provides the commander feedback.

6-5. Inspector general inspection reports

a. Each IG inspection will involve a verbal or written report to the authority directing the inspection, or to staff members and subordinate commanders, as appropriate. As a minimum, the report will be given to the authority directing the inspection. Selected portions of reports, or appropriate extracts, will be provided to other commanders or agency heads who are responsible for solving identified problems. If corrective action is beyond the authority or capability of the inspected command, "handoff" procedures will be used as described in paragraph *i*. At the conclusion of each inspection, the inspecting IG will prepare a written report of the inspection and maintain that report in the IG office. The purpose of this written report is to ensure continuity of operations and to provide a baseline for followup inspections, inspection planning, and trend analysis. When reporting the results of an IG inspection, care must be taken to ensure that the findings are presented logically and thoroughly. Such attention to detail facilitates the detection and reporting of trends, assists with followup, standardizes procedures, and makes the transition during handoffs easier.

b. Inspector general inspection findings need to be thorough, detailed, and accurate in order to provide the inspected unit or agency, the directing authority, and the person or agency responsible for fixing the problem sufficient information to address the issues or problems discovered. While there is no specified format for reporting findings, all findings should include sufficient information so that corrective action can be taken. The recommended five-part format for IG inspection findings follows;

- (1) The finding statement, which is a concise statement of the problem.
- (2) The standard, which restates law, policy, or regulation; the way it ought to be.
- (3) Inspection results, which describe what was found during the inspection.
- (4) The root cause, which explains why something is not in compliance with standards.

(5) The recommendation, which details how to fix the problem and identifies the person or activity with responsibility to fix the problem.

c. The directing authority will determine distribution of all DAIG inspection reports on a case-by-case basis. (See sec II for IG technical inspections.) Command and State IGs are encouraged to provide their inspection reports to The Inspector General (ATTN: SAIG-ID), 1700 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-1700. (See paras 3-4 and 3-5 for guidance on dissemination of DAIG inspection reports.)

d. The use of formal replies to IG findings or reports is not required unless specifically directed by the commander. (See para 6-8d for actions required with regard to IG technical inspections.)

e. Inspector general inspection reports will identify significant problems involving readiness. With the exception of reports of IG technical and intelligence oversight inspections, reports will provide recommended solutions and fix responsibility for correcting identified deficiencies.

f. Ratings, such as satisfactory or unsatisfactory, will not be used by IGs as an overall unit rating. The use of overall ratings detracts from the desired corrective actions that are achieved through teaching and training and overcoming systemic weaknesses. The only exceptions to this are for Technical Inspections and Intelligence Oversight inspections.

g. During IG inspections, meritorious conditions or innovative problem solutions should be identified and formally recognized. Identifying and disseminating innovative ideas and lessons learned must receive the same emphasis as identifying and correcting deficiencies.

h. The IG inspection reports of National Guard (NG) activities, directed by authority other than the State AG, will be provided through the Chief, NGB (ATTN: IG) to the State AG (ATTN: IG).

i. Handoffs.

(1) When findings are beyond the authority or ability of the inspected command to correct, they will be transferred through IG or command channels to the appropriate HQ agency for corrective action. This is called a handoff.

(2) Findings that are handed off will be staffed for comments through the MACOM IG prior to being handed off to DAIG for action. The DAIG address is as follows: The Inspector General (office symbol), 1700 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-1700. The following office symbols apply:

(a) SAIG-TI for Technical Inspections

(b) SAIG-IO for Intelligence Oversight Inspections

(c) SAIG-ID for all other inspections

(3) The IG receiving the handoff will keep the originating IG informed of the location and status of the finding.

(4) Appropriate findings for handoff to DAIG include (but are not limited to) the following:

(a) When the findings involve DA action addressees or multiple MACOMs or they are of a magnitude requiring Army-wide actions.

(b) When the proponent is HQDA.

(c) When corrective action resulting from one MACOM's handoff to another MACOM did not solve the problem.

(d) When action is required from outside DA.

Section II

Technical Inspections

6-6. Inspections guidance

a. This section, used with AR 50-5, AR 50-6, and AR 50-7, provides guidance for the conduct of nuclear surety inspections (NSI), chemical surety inspections (CSI), and management evaluations. This section applies to IGs assigned to DAIG. Field IGs with questions or issues concerning technical inspections will contact SAIG-TI for guidance.

b. Compliance oriented technical inspections mirror, to a great extent, other IG-conducted inspections. As such, procedures for protection of confidentiality (see para 6-3h) and applicable inspections policy (see para 6-3) apply.

6-7. Objectives and jurisdiction

a. Objectives.

(1) *Nuclear.* NSI assess the adequacy and ensure standardization of nuclear procedures for Army organizations, facilities, and activities having nuclear missions. Nuclear management evaluations (NMEs) inquire into the nuclear functions and responsibilities of Army organizations, facilities, and activities to determine management, systemic, or functional problem areas in the Army Nuclear Surety Program. NSI and NME—

(a) Ensure adherence to approved nuclear technical, health, safety, security, and reliability standards and procedures.

(b) Provide MACOMs with inspection results for use in their OIP to assist in determining the status of unit nuclear mission capability.

(c) Keep Army leaders and appropriate authorities informed of the status of the Army's Nuclear Surety Program.

(2) *Chemical.* CSI assess the adequacy and ensure standardization of chemical procedures for Army organizations, facilities, and activities having chemical missions. Chemical management evaluations (CME) inquire into the chemical

functions and responsibilities of Army organizations, facilities, and activities to determine management, systemic, or functional problem areas in the Army Chemical Surety Program. CSI and CME—

(a) Ensure adherence to approved chemical technical, health, safety, accountability, security, reliability, and demilitarization standards and procedures.

(b) Provide MACOMs with inspection results for use in their OIP to assist in determining the status of chemical mission capability.

(c) Keep Army leaders and appropriate authorities informed of the status of the Army's Chemical Surety Program.

b. *TIG's technical inspection jurisdiction.* TIG establishes inspection policies and standard procedures for conduct of NSI, CSI, and management evaluations. Technical inspections of units and activities are conducted at intervals as specified in AR 50-5 and AR 50-6.

c. *DAIG NSI and NME procedures.*

(1) Conducts NSI of all Active Army units and activities having nuclear support missions.

(2) Conducts Reactor Facility Inspections (RFI) per AR 50-5 and AR 50-7.

(3) Conduct NME of nuclear surety functional areas to identify systemic issues within the Army, as appropriate.

(4) Request that HQDA agencies, MACOM, and other commanders provide personnel, on a TDY basis, as required by TIG, to assist in conducting NSI and NME. TIG will determine qualifications for these personnel.

d. *DAIG CSI and CME procedures.*

(1) Conducts CSI of all Active Army activities and contractors having chemical, storage support, demilitarization, or instructional missions.

(2) Chemical surety inspections (CSI). In general, these inspections examine the following functional areas:

(a) Mission operations.

(b) Safety.

(c) Security.

(d) Surety management.

(e) Accident and incident response.

(f) External support.

(g) Instructional programs.

(3) Conducts CME of chemical surety functional areas to identify systemic issues within the Army, as appropriate.

(4) Requests HQDA agencies and MACOM and other commanders provide personnel, on a TDY basis, as required by TIG, to assist in conducting CSI and CME. TIG will determine qualifications for these personnel.

6-8. Inspection procedures

a. *Inspection schedule.* The USAIGA's Technical Inspections Division, will develop schedules for NSI and CSI. These schedules will be published annually.

b. *Reports of inspections.* A separate written report will be made for each inspection. The IG responsible for making the inspection will prepare or supervise preparation of the report.

c. *Routing of inspection reports.* The USAIGA's Technical Inspection Division will forward one copy of reports of NSI and CSI they conduct per AR 50-5 and AR 50-6.

d. *Action required on NSI and CSI reports covered by AR 50-5 and 50-6.* The HQDA IG NSI and CSI reports will be processed per AR 50-5 or 50-6, respectively.

e. *Inspection rating.*

(1) Ratings for NSI are specified in AR 50-5.

(2) Ratings for CSI are specified in AR 50-6.

(3) No ratings will be assigned to nuclear and chemical management evaluations.

Section III

Intelligence Oversight Inspections

6-9. Inspections guidance

a. Inspectors general must provide intelligence oversight for the intelligence components within their command. IG's at all levels have the responsibility to inspect intelligence activities as part of their commander's OIP.

b. This section, used with AR 381-10 and Executive Order 12333, provides guidance for the conduct of intelligence oversight inspections. This section applies to all IGs.

6-10. Intelligence oversight purpose and procedures

a. AR 381-10 sets forth 15 procedures governing the activities of intelligence components that affect U.S. persons as defined in that regulation. Procedures 2 through 4 provide the sole authority by which such components may collect, retain, and disseminate information concerning U.S. persons.

b. These procedures enable DOD intelligence components to effectively carry out their authorized functions while

ensuring any activities that affect U.S. persons are carried out in a manner that protects the constitutional rights and privacy of such persons.

c. Procedure 14 requires each intelligence component to familiarize its personnel with the provisions of Executive Order 12333, AR 381-10, and applicable implementing instructions. At a minimum, such familiarization shall contain—

(1) Applicable portions of Procedures 1 through 4.

(2) A summary of other procedures that pertain to collection techniques that are, or may be, employed by the intelligence component.

(3) A statement of individual employee reporting responsibility under Procedure 15.

d. Procedure 15 requires IGs, as part of their inspection of intelligence activities and components, to—

(1) Seek to determine whether such components are involved in any questionable activities.

(2) Ascertain whether any organization, staffs, or offices within their respective jurisdictions, but not otherwise specifically identified as DOD intelligence components, are being used for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes to which Executive Order 12333 applies and, if so, ensure the activities of such components are in compliance with AR 381-10 and applicable policy.

(3) Ensure that procedures exist within such components for the reporting of questionable activities and that employees of such components are aware of their responsibilities to report such activities.

6-11. Inspection methodology

a. The Intelligence Oversight Division (IOD) of the U.S. Army Inspector General Agency (USAIGA) has developed an inspection methodology to assist field IGs in the conduct of intelligence oversight inspections. This methodology can be an effective tool in determining compliance with AR 381-10, assessing soldier/civilian knowledge of the regulation, and identifying questionable activities.

(1) Inspectors general should identify intelligence components and personnel performing intelligence functions. Typically these are numbered Military Intelligence (MI) units and G-2/S-2 offices. They may be security personnel with additional intelligence duties. Some of these "dual-hatted" personnel may not realize they are subject to the provisions of AR 381-10.

(2) The intelligence component should brief the IG on their operations and their intelligence oversight program. Elements of importance are—

(a) Intelligence oversight program existence (beyond a "paper" program).

(b) A designated point of contact for intelligence oversight.

(3) Inspectors general should determine whether the intelligence component handles U.S. person information and, if so, determine under what authority. Generally speaking, military intelligence organizations or offices, with the exception of strategic counterintelligence units, do not handle information on U.S. persons. When they do, it is generally because the organization/office is also performing non-intelligence functions, such as personnel security. At the installation level, the intelligence function is often an extra duty of the security officer. In such cases, AR 381-10 applies only to the intelligence portion of that individual's duties.

(4) Inspectors general should assess the ability of unit members to apply AR 381-10 in practical situations. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT), HQDA, has developed an Internet page with 25 scenarios and solutions. Additionally, the DOD IO office and IO offices of other Services have Internet sites containing useful information.

(5) Both paper and electronic unit intelligence files should be checked. Threat files, particularly force protection files, can be problem areas. Military intelligence components do not have the mission to collect information on U.S. domestic threats. This is a law enforcement/Provost Marshal function. Some incidental information on a U.S. person may be in documents prepared by intelligence components outside the command. This incidental information does not necessarily violate AR 381-10, as long as the information is properly filed (that is, not retrievable by reference to the U.S. person) and is not extracted to produce intelligence products.

(6) Inspectors general should determine if the intelligence component knows how to report a questionable activity as required by Procedure 15. Unit members should be able to identify the designated IO point of contact (POC). They should understand the IG's role in IO, as well.

b. If, in the course of the inspection, it appears questionable activity has occurred, the intelligence component should submit a Procedure 15 report, in accordance with AR 381-10. Questions concerning questionable activities, or the conduct of IO inspections, can be answered by contacting IOD at U.S. Army Headquarters: The Inspector General (ATTN: SAIG-IOD), 1700 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-1700. Alternatively, e-mail: IOD@daig.ignet.army.mil, or telephone (703) 697-6698, 6697, or 6630 (DSN 227). Unclassified fax is DSN 225-7600, (703) 695-7600.

THE INSPECTION SELECTION PROCESS




Figure 6-1. Recommended Inspection Selection Process




Figure 6-2. The Inspection Process

Chapter 7 The Inspector General Assistance Function

7-1. Assistance function

a. This chapter provides policy and guidance to IGs in the Active Army, the USAR, and the ARNGUS regarding the assistance function. The NG IGs will refer to paragraph 7-7 for additional policy and guidance unique to the ARNGUS.

b. For assistance in implementing policies and procedures in this chapter, contact the DAIG Training Division and the DAIG Assistance Division. The functional proponent for IGARS is the DAIG Assistance Division.

c. Inspectors general providing assistance to complainants should use IG (technical) channels, to include the MACOM IG as well as USAIGA's Assistance Division, as a resource for information in handling specific case issues. The Army Inspector General School is also available as a resource in handling process and doctrinal issues.

d. Army IGs will provide assistance on an area basis so that anyone can go to the nearest IG to request help or

information. (See paras 1-4b(3) and 1-4c(3).) In the absence of a MOA or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or support agreement between the commands and agencies involved or affected, these area requirements are intended to provide for IG coverage for routine assistance matters concerning local issues involving the Army at locations where the local Army IG is best suited to accomplish the appropriate resolution actions. Routine assistance matters involving local issues presented by personnel assigned to Army organizations without assigned IGs (for example, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) PMs/PEOs, civilian personnel operations centers (CPOCs), Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs), and so forth), routine assistance matters involving local elements of Army organizations without assigned IGs, and routine assistance requirements involving local issues presented by personnel at locations geographically separated from their command IG, all fall within the parameters and meaning of these provisions for area support. Inspector general channels will be used to coordinate efforts, hand off cases, or to resolve concerns regarding IG jurisdiction. If necessary, DAIG will resolve systemic issues involving Army organizations without an IG and coordinate inspections or investigative actions. When processing a request for assistance, IGs will give priority attention to protecting confidentiality. (See para 1-12.)

7-2. Definitions

Significant IG assistance function terms are defined in the glossary.

7-3. Conducting an assistance inquiry

a. The IG assistance function begins with the receipt of an IGAR. Inspectors general employ the IGAP, including selecting appropriate courses of action for the IGAR. (Contact HQDA (SAIG-TR) for IGAP guidance.) In many cases, IGs exercise both the assistance and investigation functions concurrently, especially when IGARs contain multiple issues. When IGs determine that a request for assistance is appropriate for IG action, they will use the assistance inquiry as the fact-finding process to gather the information needed to resolve the IGAR issue. The assistance inquiry is an informal fact-finding process used to address or respond to a complaint involving a request for help, information or issues and not allegations of impropriety or wrongdoing. If statements are taken, they normally are not recorded or sworn. If reduced to writing, they are normally summarized. An assistance inquiry must be timely and thorough. It must provide the basis for responding to the issues raised in the IGAR and for correcting underlying deficiencies in Army procedures and systems. The assistance inquiry may simply provide the facts to answer a question from the complainant. Each IGAR will be documented in a case file that must contain evidence and/or information that supports the conclusions reached as well as a copy or detailed summary of the response to the complainant.

b. Unlike the IG investigative inquiry in which IGs must follow specific procedures, in the assistance inquiry, the IG responsible for processing the IGAR determines the best way to conduct the inquiry. The assistance inquiry process follows:

(1) Analyze the complaint. Identify all aspects of the issues involved, both expressed by the complainant and derived by the IG. This is a continual process that began when the IG initially analyzed the issues during preliminary analysis. As the IG gathers more facts, issues are constantly assessed, evaluated, and analyzed for appropriate follow-on action.

(2) Plan actions. Inspectors general should determine where to find the policy, standard, or process involved and research the issue thoroughly. It is often important to identify the proponent of the issue or subject matter. Subject matter experts, staff action officers, other witnesses to interview, and what documentary evidence is required must also be determined.

(3) Collect and analyze information or evidence. This step includes implementing the plan and evaluating the facts and the evidence to ensure all issues are thoroughly addressed. The facts and evidence must lead to a reasonable conclusion or recommendation. Inspectors general should verify the facts with the proponent when it is appropriate. Inspector general technical channels can be used for additional assistance when necessary.

(4) Recommend and/or apply solution. Inspectors general provide the information requested by the complainant or resolve the request for help. The complainant's supervisory chain and the proponent are involved as appropriate. The solution could be providing the impetus for another agency's action, for example, a revision of a policy, or a suggestion to the complainant of a particular course of action. Inspectors general always conduct teaching and training whenever necessary.

(5) Follow up with complainant. Inspectors general ensure that the solution adequately addresses the complaint.

(6) Close the case. A final response to the complainant is prepared that addresses the issues presented in the IGAR and protects the privacy of all involved individuals. The case file is reviewed for thoroughness and appropriate documentary evidence. Extraneous material must be removed from case files. IGARS database requirements will be completed and the case closed.

c. An appropriate format for recording the results of an IG assistance inquiry is to list each request or issue, present and provide a discussion of the relevant facts and evidence, and state a conclusion. The format for the ROI may also be used (see para 8-7). This format provides a logical and disciplined presentation of information or evidence that leads to a justifiable conclusion.

d. When an IG interviews a person, the IG may record impressions of the person's attitude, sincerity, and truthfulness. The IG will enter these observations in the IGAR file and will clearly indicate they are IG opinions.

Note. The file is subject to FOIA release.

e. If appropriate to the case, IGs will inform the complainant of established means of redress. Paragraphs 4-4 and 7-4 list some specific types of redress available. Inspectors general will limit their assistance in these cases to a review of whether due process was afforded the complainant.

f. A complainant may voluntarily withdraw an IGAR at any time. The IG will not suggest that a complainant withdraw an IGAR; however, if the complainant desires to do so, IGs will obtain a request from the complainant in writing. Inspectors general should be concerned that reprisal for presenting the complaint to the IG is not a factor in the request for withdrawal. Inspectors general will question the complainant to ensure reprisal has not occurred. When an IGAR is withdrawn, the commander or detailed IG may elect to continue to process some or all of the IGAR to address deficiencies in Army procedures or systems or to address an impropriety that developed after processing of the IGAR has begun.

7-4. Actions pertaining to certain types of Inspector General Action Requests

a. *Pay-related IGARs.* If pay complaints cannot be resolved by the local finance office, the IG should contact DFAS IG for assistance. The DFAS IG will either accept the case or inform the local IG to refer the case to one of the appropriate Defense Finance and Accounting Service Centers listed below:

- (1) Active Duty Pay - Indianapolis
- (2) Reserve Pay - Indianapolis
- (3) Retiree Pay (military and civilian) - Cleveland
- (4) Annuitant Pay - Denver
- (5) Garnishment - Cleveland
- (6) Vendor Pay - Indianapolis
- (7) Civilian Pay - Charleston

b. *Soldier nonsupport of family members or private indebtedness.*

(1) If a family member alleges lack of basic needs such as food or shelter, IGs should ensure that the immediate basic needs of the family are met. Local social support agencies, both military and civilian, should be contacted for assistance in this matter.

(2) Resolving nonsupport and indebtedness claims is a command responsibility; the IG's primary role is to ensure that the commander is aware of complaints and takes appropriate action. AR 608-99, as applicable, establishes commanders responsibilities in nonsupport cases.

(3) AR 600-15 prescribes commander's actions for private indebtedness cases. An IG becoming involved with these matters will determine if the complainant has forwarded the complaint to the soldier's commander. If not, the IG should offer assistance in formulating and properly routing the complaint. If the complainant has already initiated appropriate action, the IG should continue assistance only if the commander has not responded satisfactorily. In that case, the matter should be handled in IG channels only to the extent necessary to ascertain if the commander fulfilled obligations required by law and regulation.

(4) The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) is the proponent for AR 608-99. As such, issues involving nonsupport should be coordinated with the servicing SJA.

c. *Civilian Personnel Operations Centers.*

(1) *OCONUS.* OCONUS Civilian Personnel Operations Centers (CPOCS) fall under the responsibility of the MACOM. The local IG may provide assistance as stated in paragraph 7-1 and use IG channels to coordinate efforts or hand off cases; to resolve concerns regarding IG jurisdiction, if necessary; to contact the MACOM IG regarding systemic issues involving CPOC operations; and to coordinate inspections and investigate actions.

(2) *CONUS.* CONUS CPOCs fall under the responsibility of the CPOC Management Agency and ODCSPER field operating agency (FOA). The local IG may provide assistance as stated in paragraph 7-1 and use IG channels to coordinate efforts or hand off cases; to resolve concerns regarding IG jurisdiction, if necessary; to contact DAIG regarding systemic issues involving CPOC operations; and to coordinate inspections and investigate actions.

d. *Contractor activities.* The IGs must analyze the substance of complaints and requests for assistance from contractors involved in commercial activities, procurement activities, or contracting, to determine if they are proper for IG action. Contractor activities normally are within the jurisdiction of other established avenues of redress. Coordination with the supporting judge advocate, general counsel, or the DAIG's Legal Advisor is recommended.

7-5. Acting inspectors general

a. Acting IGs (AIGs) may be appointed to extend the IG assistance function to soldiers, family members, and DA civilian employees who do not have reasonable access to a detailed IG or assistant IG. The AIGs are most commonly appointed to give IG access at remote locations. Appointment of AIGs is discussed in paragraph 2-3.

b. AIGs will only process requests for assistance of a personal or administrative nature. Examples of the types of assistance appropriate for an AIG to handle are pay problems, loss of household goods, and obtaining an identification

card for a spouse. The AIG may conduct a limited assistance inquiry to help the complainant. For example, the AIG may call the DFAS to obtain information to help a complainant with a pay problem.

c. An AIG who receives a complaint or request for assistance for other than a routine administrative problem will hand off the request to the office of the supervising detailed IG for action. The AIG may listen to the complainant and record the IGAR but must advise the complainant that the detailed IG will process it.

d. The supervising detailed IG may task an acting IG to collect documents available at the acting IG's location for an inspection, inquiry, or investigation and to assist in making administrative arrangements for an inspection, assistance, or investigation team. An AIG's support of IG inspection, assistance, and investigation functions will not exceed providing this kind of limited administrative help.

7-6. Assistance visits

a. Inspectors general may make assistance visits to subordinate commands to evaluate the assistance function locally; identify or prevent problems with DA or local policies; assist soldiers and Army civilian employees and their families, IGs, and the chain of command; and gauge the pulse of the command.

b. Higher headquarters (HQ) IGs will coordinate with subordinate command IGs prior to an assistance visit. Normally, the coordination will be done 90-120 days prior to the visit, but it should be completed within the time frames required by the headquarters being visited. Subordinate command IGs will normally be invited to accompany the higher HQ IG team.

c. An assistance visit may include the following:

- (1) Arrival and exit briefings with the commander or Chief of Staff.
- (2) Tour of the installation and unit facilities and visits with the staff.
- (3) Evaluation and discussion of the IG assistance mission and other issues of interest to commanders.
- (4) IGAR (complaint) sessions.
- (5) Soldier, family member, Army civilian employee seminars or sensing sessions.
- (6) Interviews with commanders, command sergeants major, managers, and supervisors.

7-7. Assistance policy for National Guard personnel

a. *National Guard personnel, Federal, and non-Federal interest.* IGARs submitted by ARNGUS personnel that involve matters of Federal interest will be processed with the cooperation of, and in coordination with, the State AG using the procedures above. Matters involving non-Federal interest will be processed as prescribed by the State AG. IGARs submitted by ANG personnel are addressed in paragraph 1-10.

b. *EO complaints.* EO complaints of discrimination made by members of the NG on the basis of race, color, national origin, gender, or religion will be processed under NGB guidance rather than the IGAR System.

c. *Responses to Congress.*

(1) If an inquiry is received directly from a MC and there is no indication that the OCLL or DAIG has been contacted by that or any other MC on the same issue, the NG IG may respond directly to the MC, as is customary in that State for handling congressional replies. Inspectors general will contact DAIG Assistance Division to confirm that a parallel complaint has not been received from OCLL. If a parallel complaint was received at DAIG, a copy of the response to the Member of Congress will be provided to DAIG.

(2) When there is an indication that OCLL or DAIG has been contacted, the completed IG report will be forwarded through NGB to DAIG's Assistance Division.

Chapter 8

The Inspector General Investigation Function

8-1. Investigative fact-finding processes

a. Significant terms for the IG investigation function are defined in the glossary.

b. The IG investigation function encompasses two fact-finding methodologies.

(1) An IG investigation is a fact-finding examination by a detailed IG into allegations, issues, or adverse conditions to provide the directing authority a sound basis for decisions and actions. Inspector general investigations normally address allegations of wrongdoing by an individual and are authorized by written directives.

(2) An investigative inquiry is the fact-finding process followed by IGs to gather information needed to address allegations of impropriety against an individual that can accomplish the same objectives as an IG investigation. Command and State IGs normally use this investigative process when the involvement of the directing authority is not foreseen. This does not preclude directing authorities from directing an investigative inquiry. The command or State IG typically directs the investigative inquiry and provides recommendations to their commander or to subordinate commanders as appropriate. The investigative inquiry is the primary fact-finding process used by IGs to address allegations.

(a) An assistant IG may assist a detailed IG in the conduct of an investigation. Assistant IGs may conduct

investigative inquiries within the limits prescribed at paragraphs 2-2d(3) and 8-4 of this regulation. An acting IG may provide only limited administrative assistance.

(b) If a legal issue is involved, IGs should first contact their servicing SJA or Command Judge Advocate before seeking the advice of TIG's Legal Advisor.

8-2. Duties of inspector general investigators

a. Inspector general investigators—

(1) Conduct IG investigations and investigative inquiries, following policy and procedures in this regulation. For additional information, IGs may contact DAIG Assistance or Investigations Division. Questions pertaining to specific cases directed by TIG should normally be referred to the DAIG Assistance Division. The DAIG Training Division also publishes guides containing doctrinal guidance for implementing the investigative policies of this chapter.

(2) Make or obtain conscious decisions on disposition of all allegations. Inspectors general will not discard an allegation solely because it appears frivolous, unimportant, not relevant to matters under investigation, or is subsequently withdrawn by the complainant.

(3) Obtain evidence sufficient to determine that an allegation is either substantiated or not substantiated. Preponderance of credible evidence is the standard of proof IGs use to substantiate or not substantiate allegations. Preponderance is defined as "superiority of weight." Word allegations carefully; a substantiated allegation must always represent an impropriety. (See definition of allegation at glossary.)

(4) Include in the Report of Investigation (ROI) or Report of Investigative Inquiry (ROI) a complete, objective, and impartial presentation of all pertinent evidence gathered during the investigation/inquiry. The report should stand alone and should be fully understood by anyone who reads it. (See para 8-7 for additional discussions of ROI/ROI.)

(5) Do not recommend adverse action against an individual. Inspectors general are fact-finders who present the facts to the directing/approving authority in a ROI/ROI. The ROI/ROI will not contain recommendations for adverse action against an individual. However, administrative action to correct a mistake (for example, recovery of an improper TDY payment) may be made part of an IG investigation recommendation. The IGs may assist the directing authority by consulting with the SJA, USACIDC, Military Police Investigator (MPI), other staff activities, or subordinate commanders and present their recommendations to the directing authority.

(a) Inspector general records will not be used as the basis for adverse actions unless approved by TIG. (See para 3-3.)

(b) The directing/approving authority must consider possible adverse consequences of employing the ROI/ROI as the basis for an adverse action. An individual against whom adverse action is contemplated has due process rights that may require release of confidential testimony, personal information, and deliberative material (opinions, conclusions, and recommendations of investigations). Such release might compromise the integrity of the IG System and the IG's ability to serve the commander as an impartial confidential fact-finder.

(6) Report systemic problems discovered during investigative activities to the appropriate authority and follow up to ensure corrective action is taken.

b. In all investigative activities, IGs will be sensitive to actual and potential concerns that people have about keeping both the fact and extent of their involvement confidential. (See paras 1-12 and 3-4b.)

c. Inspectors general will close the case using the ROI/ROI format outlined in this regulation at paragraph 8-7. One of the IG recommendations should be to "close the case" or "turn the case over to a follow-on investigator" as appropriate.

8-3. Jurisdiction

a. Inspectors general may investigate or conduct investigative inquiries into allegations of the following:

(1) Violations of policy, regulation, or law.

(2) Mismanagement, unethical behavior, fraud, or misconduct that, if true, may be of concern to the directing authority.

b. Inspectors general should not normally investigate or conduct investigative inquiries when—

(1) The alleged impropriety is of a nature that, if substantiated, would likely constitute criminal misconduct except as specified in paragraph c below. While many allegations of acts or omissions can theoretically be seen as criminal insofar as they could be phrased as a dereliction of duty, violation of a regulation, or conduct unbecoming an officer, this does not necessarily preclude an investigation or inquiry by an IG. The directing authority may still direct the IG to conduct an investigation or inquiry. Coordination or consultation with the appropriate legal advisor will be conducted in cases such as this and with USACIDC officials if appropriate.

(2) Substantiation of allegations appears certain at the outset of the IG analysis of the IGAR, and it appears certain adverse actions against individuals will occur. An example of this is the criminal allegation of assault that is punishable under the UCMJ. (See paras 3-3 and 8-9 and AR 195-2, app b.)

(3) The Army has established means of redress. (See para 4-4.)

(4) The chain of command decides to address the issues and allegations. If a subordinate commander has the ability

to conduct a commander's investigation or inquiry, the IG should afford the subordinate commander the opportunity unless otherwise directed by the IG's commander and directing authority (see paras *l* and *m* below).

(5) The allegations involve professional misconduct by an Army lawyer, military or civilian. Such allegations will be referred through the DAIG Legal Advisor to the senior counsel (for example, The General Counsel of the Army, TJAG of the Army, the Command Counsel of the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC), or the Chief Counsel of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) having jurisdiction over the subject lawyer, for disposition.

(6) The allegations involve mismanagement by a member of the Judge Advocate Legal Service serving in a supervisory capacity. Such allegations will be referred through the DAIG Legal Advisor to TJAG for disposition under the provisions of AR 27-1.

c. The SA has authorized TIG to investigate all Army activities. Only the SA, Under Secretary of the Army (USofA), CSA, VCSA, and TIG may direct conduct of DAIG investigations. Heads of HQDA agencies, commanders, and State AGs may request that TIG conduct an investigation, but they are not authorized to direct TIG to do so. In accordance with paragraph 1-4*b*(5), TIG may direct a command or State IG to conduct inquiries or investigations.

d. Commanders whose staffs include a detailed IG may direct IG investigations into activities within their command. Detailed IGs are authorized to inquire or investigate within their organizations and activities, as specified by their directing authority and this regulation. Installation IGs may conduct investigations and inquiries at tenant MACOM units after mutual agreement between the installation IG and the tenant unit's MACOM IG.

e. State AGs whose States have detailed IGs may direct IG investigations or inquiries into Federally related activities within their States to include both Army National Guard and Air National Guard matters. (See para 1-9.)

f. Allegations against subordinate commands or commanders within the IG's sphere of activity may be investigated as directed by the IG's commander (directing authority). Allegations against the IG's command or commander will be forwarded to the next higher IG for disposition unless the commander is a general officer or senior civilian. (See paras *h* and *i* below for exceptions.)

g. Any IGAR containing an allegation against a MSG, SGM, or CSM or any Army officer in the grade of major through colonel that has resulted in the initiation of an IG investigation, investigative inquiry, or a command directed action (for example, AR 15-6 investigation, commander's inquiry, UCMJ action, and so forth) will be reported to TIG (ATTN: SAIG-AC) within 2 working days after receipt by rapid and confidential means. (See paras 1-4*b*(5)(*b*) and 4-6*c*.)

h. Allegations against IGs will be reported to the next higher echelon IG for appropriate action within 2 working days after receipt by rapid and confidential means. An information copy of the report (with the IGAR, allegation, and the complaint attached) will be forwarded to TIG (SAIG-AC) and the MACOM IG concurrent with the report to the next higher echelon IG. TIG retains the authority to investigate the allegation under the provisions of paragraphs 1-4*a*(12) and 1-4(16)(*d*). Therefore, command and State IGs will notify TIG of any anticipated command or IG action before proceeding with resolving the allegation. The nature of the allegations will determine which IG office or level of command will conduct the investigation. The MACOM IG will consult with USAIGA's Assistance Division to determine the best course of action to resolve the allegation and inform Assistance Division of the assessment and recommendations.

(1) TIG concurrence must be obtained for appropriate action (inquiry or investigation) to resolve these allegations before such actions are initiated.

(2) If the allegations involve violations of AR 20-1 or IG policy, the next higher IG, in coordination with DAIG Assistance Division, will normally be required to conduct the inquiry or investigation.

(3) If the allegation deals with misconduct or other non-IG related offenses, the command may relieve the IG for cause and use other investigative (for example, AR 15-6 investigation) methods or administrative actions to determine the facts of the case after coordination with DAIG Assistance Division.

i. Investigations of allegations of improprieties by general officers, brigadier general selectees, and senior civilian employees of the Army will be conducted as follows:

(1) Only the SA, USofA, CSA, VCSA, and TIG may authorize or direct an IG inquiry or investigation into allegations of improprieties or misconduct by general officers, brigadier general selectees, and civilian employees of SES or equivalent grade or position. As a matter of Army policy, when such allegations are suspected against a senior official or found during an ongoing inquiry or investigation conducted by non-IG sources (for example, Commander's Inquiry, AR 15-6 or USACIDC or similar investigations), the commander or command concerned shall halt the inquiry or investigation as it regards any specific allegations against a senior official and report any and all such allegations directly to DAIG's Investigations Division for determination of further action. As an exception, equal employment opportunity inquiries or investigations may continue even if they involve senior officials provided DAIG has been notified.

(2) Any and all allegations of impropriety or misconduct (including criminal allegations) against general officers (including ARNGUS, USAR, and retired general officers), brigadier general selectees, and senior civilians must be forwarded by commanders or IGs directly to the DAIG Investigations Division by a rapid and confidential means within 2 working days of receipt. Inspectors general will not conduct any fact-finding into the nature of the allegations unless authorized by TIG, DTIG, or Chief, Investigations Division, DAIG.

(3) Inspectors general who receive allegations of impropriety against general officers and senior civilians may tell their commanders the general nature of the allegations and the identity of the persons against whom the allegations were made but will first contact DAIG Investigations Division for advice. An open investigation may already exist, and the commander may have already been informed by DAIG. To help protect the complainant's confidentiality, do not reveal either the source or specific nature of the allegations. TIG will ensure commanders, MACOM IGs, and CNGB receive additional information as appropriate. (See para 1-12.)

(4) If the IG who receives the allegation works for the subject of the allegation, or if there are any questions, the IG will contact the Chief, Investigations Division, DAIG, for guidance. This procedure is intended to allow DAIG to make the notification to the commander to prevent placing the IG in an ethical dilemma. See appendix D for additional information for procedures for investigations of allegations against senior officials.

(5) Address questions to The Inspector General (ATTN: SAIG-IN), 1702 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-1702, or The Inspector General (ATTN: SAIG-ZXL), 1714 Pentagon Army, Washington, DC 20310-1714.

j. Forward allegations against PMs or PEOs who are general officers or DA civilian employees of the SES or equivalent grade to DAIG's Investigations Division, per paragraph 8-3f. If allegations are made against the PM or PEO staff, the supporting MACOM or major subordinate command (MSC) IG, will normally conduct the IG inquiry or IG investigation (see para 1-4b(5)). The PM or PEO will be told the general nature of the allegation and the identity of the individual against whom the allegation has been made. At the conclusion of the investigation, the PM or PEO may be informed of the results of the investigation or inquiry, when appropriate. Final approval authority for the ROI or ROII remains with the directing authority.

k. Forward allegations reference whistleblower, reprisal, and/or improper mental health evaluation referrals to DAIG-AC within 2 working days.

l. When an allegation is referred to a commander, Criminal Investigation Division (CID), Department of the Army or non-Department of the Army agency, IGs will process the IGAR in accordance with the assistance and investigative guidance as developed by SAIG-TR in coordination with SAIG-AC. This written guidance is available from SAIG-TR.

m. Directing authorities may, at any time, terminate an IG inquiry or investigation that they directed. When this occurs, the IG conducting it will process the IGAR in accordance with procedural guidance of SAIG-AC.

8-4. Conduct of inspector general investigations and investigative inquiries

a. The IG investigation function includes IG investigations and IG investigative inquiries, which are most commonly conducted to resolve allegations of individual wrongdoing. IG investigations are conducted by detailed IGs and are limited to the matters approved by the directing authority. Detailed IGs will actively participate in IG investigations and will not permit assistant IGs to conduct the investigation de facto. A detailed IG who allows an assistant IG to gather all the evidence and then reviews and approves the assistant IG's work is not actively involved with the investigation. All IG reports of investigation and investigative inquiry will be written in the IG investigations format addressed at paragraph 8-7.

b. An IG investigation is a formal fact-finding process that incorporates the following procedures.

(1) Obtain a written directive from the directing authority (see the glossary for the definition of directive) and enclose it to the ROI. Normally, the detailed IG responsible for the investigation will obtain the directive from the directing authority.

(2) Verbally notify appropriate commanders or supervisors and the subjects or suspects of the investigation and inform them of the nature of the allegations. The notifications will be documented and enclosed to the ROI.

(3) Develop an investigative plan.

(4) Gather evidence and take sworn and recorded testimony. Comply with the Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act notices and render rights warnings when required. The detailed IG must participate in these processes.

(5) Evaluate the evidence and write the ROI.

(6) Obtain a written legal review of the ROI from the supporting judge advocate. The command or State IG will then gain the approval of the ROI from the directing authority.

(7) Notify the appropriate commanders or supervisors, complainant (only allegations directly pertaining to the complainant), and subjects or suspects of the approved results of the investigation in writing and enclose the notifications in the ROI/case.

c. The IG investigative inquiry is less formal than an IG investigation and is used when there is an allegation that does not warrant an investigation. Inspectors general will conduct the investigative inquiry similar to an IG investigation (see para b) with the following exceptions.

(1) The command or State IG may direct the investigative inquiry.

(2) Witness statements are not required to be sworn and recorded testimony. The use of interview guides is optional but recommended, especially for subjects and suspects to ensure that due process is afforded and their rights are protected (see app E).

(3) A written legal review of the ROII from the supporting judge advocate will be obtained when there is a

substantiated allegation(s). On a case-by-case basis obtain legal review as required for ROII with not substantiated allegations.

(4) The directing authority or the command or State IG will approve the ROII (see para 8-7c).

(5) Actions under the provisions of paragraphs (1) through (3) above will be documented and enclosed in the ROII.

d. If the allegation(s) in the IG investigation/investigative inquiry is substantiated, it is mandatory for all Army IGs to formally notify the subject/suspect in writing as to the conclusions. It is the right of all subjects or suspects to address the unfavorable information against them (see para 4-10).

e. Expanding the scope of an IG investigation or investigative inquiry, or adding additional allegations or individuals not originally addressed in the beginning of the investigation, requires approval of the directing authority, command or State IG who initially directed the action. If the IG discovers matters requiring investigative action that are totally unrelated to an ongoing IG investigation or inquiry, the IG will report them to the directing authority or take appropriate action.

f. In most IG investigations and investigative inquiries, evidence will be obtained from documents and interviews of witnesses. Inspectors general always seek the best available evidence through the collection of relevant documents and the interviews of the best witnesses (first-hand witnesses). The best evidence from individuals is sworn and recorded testimony by persons with direct knowledge. Evidence of a lesser quality, such as memoranda of conversations, handwritten notes, unsworn statements, second-hand information (hearsay), is also acceptable. This type of evidence will be weighted accordingly.

g. Inspectors general will use interview guides when conducting interviews as part of an IG investigation. The interview guides are also recommended for use during investigative inquiries. Interview guides are formal scripts used by IGs while conducting interviews and will be read verbatim. The guides were carefully prepared to ensure technical correctness and that the IG addresses all relevant areas all witnesses, subjects, and suspects must know as part of the IG interview process. There are guides for conducting pre-tape briefings, read-ins, and read-outs (see app E). The guides are designed specifically to address those elements necessary to due process based upon the person's status in the interview. The essential elements of these guides are—

(1) *Pre-tape briefing (part I)*. The pre-tape briefing essentially explains the investigative procedure, the IG investigator's role, the ground rules for the interview, and other administrative elements of the interview prior to starting.

(2) *Read-in (part II)*. Use the appropriate interview guide depending on the status of individuals. Each interview guide is slightly different dependent upon the status of the person being interviewed.

(3) *The questioning phase of the interview (part III)*. This will be the major part of most interviews and consist of the questions relevant to the allegations.

(4) *The read-out (part IV)*. This will be read verbatim and conclude the interview.

h. Persons who provide testimony in IG investigations and inquiries will not be allowed to record their testimony by tape or any other means. (This is to protect the confidentiality of the witnesses, subjects, and suspects to the maximum extent possible.) After the IG investigation or investigative inquiry is completed and the directing authority has taken final actions, witnesses, suspects, and subjects may obtain copies of their transcribed testimony by following the procedures in paragraph 3-5a(2). Witnesses, suspects, and subjects may read their transcribed testimony prior to completion of the investigation or investigative inquiry but may not retain a copy.

i. To protect confidentiality of IG investigations and the rights, privacy, and reputations of all people involved in them, during notifications and interviews, IGs will ask people with whom they are talking not to disclose the matters under investigation or inquiry and not to discuss them with anyone, except their own personal counsel if they consult one, without permission of the IG. Inspectors general will not withhold permission for defense counsels to interview witnesses about matters under investigation, but defense counsels will not be provided names of IG witnesses because of IG confidentiality requirements. Defense counsels must find these witnesses through their own procedures.

j. Two investigative conclusions will be used by IGs. These conclusions will contain the specific allegation(s) and state that the allegation occurred (substantiated) or did not occur (not substantiated). These conclusions will establish the IG's findings regarding the violation by a specific individual of an established standard and will not be vague statements.

(1) Substantiated: The conclusion of "substantiated" will be used when a preponderance of credible evidence, as viewed by a reasonable person, exists to prove the allegation.

(2) Not substantiated: The conclusion of "not substantiated" will be used when a preponderance of credible evidence, as viewed by a reasonable person, does not exist to support the allegation.

(3) The "neither substantiated nor refuted" conclusion will not be used.

(4) The terms "partially substantiated" or "substantiated in part" will not be used.

8-5. Discussion of rights

a. A witness is a person who saw, heard, knows, or has something relevant to the issues being investigated and who is not a subject or suspect. A subject is a person against whom noncriminal allegation(s) have been made, such as a violation of a local policy or regulation that is not punitive. A suspect is a person against whom criminal allegations have been made (the alleged acts are violations of punitive articles of the UCMJ, regulations that are punitive, or other

criminal laws). A person may also become a suspect as a result of incriminating information that arises during an investigation or interview, or whenever the questioner believes, or reasonably should believe, the person committed a criminal offense. The appropriate rights warning for persons interviewed during an IG inquiry or investigation varies with their status. DA Form 3881, Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate will be used for interviews of suspects and in some cases may be used for subjects.

b. DA personnel who are witnesses or subjects may not lawfully refuse to answer questions properly related to an IG inquiry or investigation unless answering the question will incriminate them, will involve certain privileged communications, or will be in violation of their right to union representation as described below. (See MCM section V, Privileges, Military Rules of Evidence.) However, if an investigator suspects, or reasonably should suspect that a soldier or DA civilian (if civilian is in custody) being questioned has committed a criminal offense, the investigator must advise them of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ, and *Miranda v. Arizona*. Soldiers or DA civilians (if civilian is in custody) who are suspected of having committed a criminal offense have the right to have a lawyer present (the lawyer can advise the suspect but not speak for the suspect), the right to remain silent during questioning related to the matter, and the right to terminate questioning. Accordingly, after being properly advised of their rights, if soldiers or DA civilians (civilians in custody) invoke their rights or fail to affirmatively waive their rights, questioning must stop immediately, and the interview must be terminated. The IG will not complete the read-out. The interview will cease at this point. Because the circumstances under which questioning may be resumed are fact specific, the investigator should consult with the local legal office before initiating further discussions with these individuals. (See UCMJ, Art. 31, Military Rules of Evidence (M.R.E.) 304 and M.R.E. 305, MCM.) Whenever in doubt concerning these rules, the interviewer should consult with their servicing SJA or DAIG Legal Advisor.

c. Union representation at interviews (see section 7114(a)(2)(A), title 5, United States Code) (5 USC 7114(a)(2)(B)).

(1) All Army civilian employees who are represented by any labor organization that is certified as the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit, have a right to union representation at any investigative examination. If the employee reasonably believes that the examination may result in disciplinary action against the employee, representation may be requested by the employee. In addition, the local union contract may provide for union representation even when the employee does not request it. Inspectors general should know the contents of the local union contract or should coordinate with the local CPAC management-employee relations specialist.

(2) Although subjects and suspects are the most likely sources of such requests, witnesses may also make them. If a witness is otherwise entitled to representation, as specified in subparagraph (1) above, IGs should allow a union representative to be present.

(3) The union representative may comment, speak, or make statements; he or she may not, however, usurp or disrupt the meeting, or answer for the interviewee. In determining whether a given representative is being disruptive or usurping the interview, the IG should apply a standard of "reasonableness." The union representative's presence is in addition to any right that the employee may have to a lawyer.

(4) If the employee requests and is entitled to union representation, the IG must take every reasonable step to ensure that the union has the opportunity to represent the employee at an investigation or investigative inquiry interview. Such steps should include granting extensions and, if necessary, notifying the union that the employee is having difficulty obtaining a representative. Only when these steps have been taken may the IG proceed with the interview.

8-6. Unfavorable information

During an IG investigation or inquiry, unfavorable information (see glossary) obtained about a suspect/subject may result in an unfavorable comment in the ROI/ROII. The individual has a right to know of the unfavorable information during the IG inquiry or investigation. The IG will orally notify the person concerned (notification) of the allegations and interview the subject or suspect before the IG inquiry or investigation is completed. The IG will provide the person an opportunity to comment on the unfavorable information during the interview process. The comment may be—

a. Presented orally, in person, sworn, and recorded.

b. A suggestion to obtain the testimony of reasonably available witnesses the person desires be heard.

c. Written statements, preferably sworn, made by the person or others who wish to make a statement on that person's behalf.

d. The suggestion to obtain or consider other evidence, documentary or physical, the person wishes to present.

8-7. Reports of Investigation and Investigative Inquiry

a. *Preparation.* Inspectors general will prepare a separate written report for each IG investigation or inquiry. Complete the ROI or ROII as soon as practicable after completing the investigation or inquiry. Copies of documents that were not prepared by IGs, for example, AR 15-6 investigations, results of commander's inquiries, MP and USACIDC reports, and so forth that were considered or used by IGs to support findings, conclusions, recommendations, or resolution actions, will be included in the IG record. These non-IG work products will be a part of the IG record subject to the provisions in chapter 3.

b. *Format.* The format consists of—

(1) An executive summary (when necessary) that provides names of suspects or subjects, the authority for the

investigation, the relevant background to the case, a restatement of the allegation, and a brief discussion or synopsis of each substantiated or unsubstantiated allegation.

(2) The main body of the ROI/ROII, which consists of—

(a) Introduction (optional) if the case is complex or has extensive background information that needs to be explained.

(b) Consideration of allegations in light of the relevant evidence—the complaint, the standard alleged to have been violated, any documentary evidence (including documentation of physical evidence), testimony and statements, a discussion that concisely analyzes all of the evidence considered, and a clear conclusion of “substantiated” or “not substantiated.” If there is more than one allegation to be considered, the format is repeated until all allegations are addressed. For further guidance regarding examples and detailed discussions of these formats, contact the Training Division, HQDA (DAIG-TR).

c. Processing.

(1) The command IG or State IG will—

(a) Review and approve the ROI/ROII and forward the report to the supporting judge advocate or command counsel for legal review. Legal reviews are required for all ROIs. Legal reviews are also required for ROIs containing allegations with “substantiated” conclusions. Legal reviews are encouraged for ROIs containing allegations with “not substantiated” conclusions but are not required.

(b) Submit the ROI to the directing authority.

(c) Approve or disapprove the ROII in part or in its entirety and provide commanders with their recommendations as appropriate.

(2) The directing authority will—

(a) Approve or disapprove the report in its entirety, or approve it in part. Approval or disapproval will be indicated on the report itself over the signature of the directing authority. Commanders may delegate approval and disapproval authority during their temporary absence. General officer commanders may permanently delegate approval and disapproval authority to a general officer deputy commander or a general officer chief of staff.

(b) Take action on the approved portions that are within the authority and responsibility of the directing authority. A record of the action taken will be made a part of the original report and all copies.

(3) An ROI/ROII, or any portion of it that requires action at levels above that of the directing authority, will be forwarded, with recommendations, through IG channels to the next higher commander in the chain of command. Each higher commander will indicate approval or disapproval and take appropriate action on matters within their authority. Remaining matters will be forwarded through IG channels, with appropriate recommendations, to the next higher commander.

(4) When the IG investigation/inquiry has been directed by TIG, the immediate commander of the IG who conducted it will indicate concurrence or nonconcurrence in the investigation's conclusions. The report will then be forwarded through IG channels to TIG. As the directing authority and the IG office of record, TIG has final approval of the report. (In these cases, TIG normally directs an investigative action and allows local IGs and their directing authority to decide if an IG investigation or investigative inquiry is appropriate. The local IG is best able to define and adjust the scope of the investigative action based upon the IG's analysis of the issues and allegations and the evidence gathered.)

8-8. Recording investigations into the inspector general electronic database

ROIs and ROIs will be entered into the IG electronic database using the procedures defined in paragraph 4-10 and the procedures provided by the IGARS user's manual, issued with the database software (contact HQDA (SAIG-IR) for further guidance). Inspectors general will ensure that the summary of the case accurately addresses the allegations, facts, conclusions, findings, and recommendations. The electronic case file should also reflect the commander's actions taken when appropriate.

8-9. Other special investigations

In addition to the requirements and procedures discussed above, IGs will perform several other types of special investigations. Each is unique in some respects and is addressed below. All of the special investigations will require many of the same Army IG investigations procedures previously addressed, but each has its own special rules.

a. Responses to the President or Congress. An IG who receives a request directly from the President or a Member of Congress (MC), or from the installation or activity congressional liaison office, will notify DAIG's Assistance Division expeditiously. (For ARNGUS IGs, see para 7-7a.) If the command or activity congressional liaison office receives a case on which the IG is currently working, or has already completed an IG inquiry, the local IG must inform the tasking official that the response will be forwarded through IG channels to DAIG's Assistance Division. These cases are handled as IG cases. DAIG's Assistance Division is the office of record for these cases and will contact the Office of the Chief, Legislative Liaison (OCLL) or the White House Liaison Office (WHLO) to have the case transferred to DAIG Assistance Division. Once the investigative inquiry is complete, the local IG will forward the ROI/ROII through the MACOM IG to DAIG's Assistance Division. The DAIG Assistance Division will prepare the final

response to the complainant on behalf of the President or to the MC and furnish copies to OCLL or WHLO and the IG office (or offices) that processed the case.

b. DOD Hotline complaints. Department of Defense Directive 7050.1, Defense Hotline Program, requires that all corrective action taken regarding a case be presented in the completion report. This includes all action taken against the subject/suspect. The suspense for submission of the Hotline completion report is normally 60 days from receipt in SAIG-AC (45 days for cases with congressional interest). Inspectors general must make every effort to meet Defense Hotline completion suspense dates. When it becomes apparent that a Hotline completion suspense date will not be met, a substantive interim report with projected completion date will be sent to the Army Defense Hotline Coordinator at DAIG's Assistance Division. The DAIG Assistance Division is the Office of Record for all DOD Hotline complaints received in the Army. The format for the Defense Hotline completion report is to be in accordance with assistance and investigative guidance as developed by SAIG-TR in coordination with SAIG-AC. This written guidance is available from SAIG-TR.

c. Soldier allegations of whistleblower reprisal.

(1) Title 10, United States Code, section 1034 (10 U.S.C. 1034), revised by The Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, effective 16 October 1998, extends authority to Inspectors general within the military Departments to grant whistleblower protection for reprisal allegations presented directly to them by service members. This law, implemented by DODD 7050.6, requires Service IGs (*Note.* TIG has limited this authority to MACOM and higher level IGs) to investigate allegations of individuals taking or threatening to take unfavorable personnel actions or withholding or threatening to withhold favorable personnel action as reprisal against a member of the Armed Forces for making or preparing a protected communication. A protected communication is—

(a) Any lawful communication to a Member of Congress or an IG.

(b) A communication in which a member of the Armed Forces communicates information that the member reasonably believes evidences a violation of law or regulation, including sexual harassment or unlawful discrimination, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds or other resources, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, when such a communication is made to any of the following:

1. A Member of Congress, an IG, or a member of a DOD audit, inspection, investigation, or law enforcement organization.

2. Any other person or organization (including any person or organization in the chain of command) designated under Component regulations or other established administrative procedures (that is, EOA, safety officer) to receive such communications. (See AR 600-20 for definition of chain of command.)

(2) If, upon presentation, a soldier makes a reprisal allegation that appears to meet the criteria outlined in 10 USC 1034, the IG who receives the allegation will contact DAIG Assistance Division (SAIG-AC) promptly by telephone (within 2 days) for specific instructions regarding how to proceed. The field IG should be prepared to discuss the timeliness of the allegation (an allegation of whistleblower reprisal may be determined to be untimely if the allegation is made more than 60 days after the soldier became aware of an adverse personnel action that he or she believes was taken in reprisal), the protected communications made by the soldier, and the adverse personnel actions alleged by the soldier to be acts of reprisal. The name, grade, social security number (SSN), unit assignment, address, and phone number of the soldier also will be required. The IG should be prepared to respond to the following specific questions:

(a) What protected communications does the soldier claim that he or she made?

(b) To whom were they made?

(c) When were they made?

(d) What matters were addressed in the protected communication (that is, gross mismanagement, waste, public safety, abuse, and so forth)?

(e) What are the adverse personnel actions alleged by the soldier?

(f) Who are the responsible management officials alleged by the soldier to have taken or threatened the adverse personnel action? Allegations against senior Army officials (that is, general officers and civilians in the grade of SES) must be reported to the DAIG Investigations Division (SAIG-IN) within 2 days of receipt.

(g) When were the adverse personnel actions against the soldier taken or threatened?

(h) When did the soldier first become aware of the adverse personnel actions?

(3) Based on the results of the coordination between DAIG-AC and the IG receiving the complaint, DAIG-AC will forward a letter to the soldier, formally acknowledging receipt of the complaint, and also will accomplish the required 1034 advisement to IG, DOD as appropriate.

(4) If, as a result of the coordination with DAIG-AC, it is determined that the soldier's allegations appear to meet the criteria for coverage under the law, then the IG receiving the complaint will be directed by DAIG-AC to forward the case to either their MACOM IG or to DAIG-AC to accomplish an IGAP. If the initial complaint is received at the MACOM, the MACOM will retain the complaint and accomplish IGAP (reporting requirements in accordance with para (2) still applies). The MACOM's IGAP will determine whether the complaint meets the criteria for coverage under the law and whether formal investigation is warranted. If it is determined during IGAP that the soldier's allegations do not appear to meet the criteria, then the MACOM IG will forward the case via IG channels to DAIG-AC for further review and reporting to IG, DOD. If it is determined during IGAP that the soldier's allegations meet the

criteria, then the MACOM IG will coordinate with DAIG-AC to determine which whistleblower investigation strategy to use and then proceed in accordance with DODD 7050.6. The MACOMs will coordinate all notification and reporting requirements with DAIG-AC. DAIG-AC will maintain oversight on all whistleblower cases.

(5) In accordance with DODD 7050.6 and DODD 6490.1, IG, DOD is the final approving authority for cases involving allegations of whistleblower reprisal and the improper referral for Mental Health Evaluation (see para e(2)). The command or State IG who investigates the reprisal allegations will obtain a directive authorizing the investigation from his or her directing authority. The investigating IG will obtain the directing authority's concurrence or nonoccurrence with the findings and conclusions of the investigation and will forward the ROI through IG channels to DAIG. Each intermediate IG will review the ROI and obtain his or her commander's endorsement regarding the findings and conclusion. ROIs will be prepared in accordance with the instructions in DODD 7050.6.

d. DOD and DA civilian employee allegations of reprisal for whistleblowing.

(1) Requirements of section 2302(b)(8), title 5, United States Code (5 USC 2302(b)(8)) provide similar coverage to appropriated fund employees as previously discussed above for members of the Armed Forces. Coverage to contractor employees is provided under section 2409(a), title 10, United States Code (10 USC 2409(a)). When a Government civilian employee presents to an IG an allegation of reprisal for protected disclosure, the IG must perform certain functions:

(2) Inform the appropriated fund civilian employee of the right to present the reprisal allegation to the Office of Special Counsel (OSC).

(3) Inform nonappropriated fund employees that they should make their complaint about reprisal to the IG, DOD in accordance with DODD 1401.3, Employment Protection for Certain Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentality Employees/Applicants.

(4) Inform contractor employees that their right to complain about reprisal is governed by the provisions of 10 USC 2409(a).

(5) If the employee elects not to present a complaint of reprisal to the OSC or IG, DOD but still wants to present the complaint to an IG, obtain that decision in writing and coordinate with the SJA and the commander to determine which type of IG action is appropriate. Inspectors general are cautioned that the provisions of paragraph 4-4k may apply if the complainant elects not to present the complaint to the appropriate agency.

e. Improper referral for mental health evaluation.

(1) DODD 6490.1, Mental Health Evaluation of Member of the Armed Forces, and DOD Instruction (DODI) 6490.4, Requirements for Mental Health Evaluation of Members of the Armed Forces, establish and implement DOD policy, assign responsibility, and prescribe procedures for the referral, evaluation, treatment and administrative management of soldiers who may require mental health evaluation, psychiatric hospitalization, or assessment for risk of potentially dangerous behavior. The directive prohibits improper referral as a punitive violation of Article 92, UCMJ, and the instruction requires the Military Departments to notify IG, DOD, within 10 working days after receipt of allegation(s) involving improper referral for a mental health evaluation (MHE) in violation of the directive.

(2) Inspectors general receiving allegations of improper referral for MHE will notify DAIG Assistance Division (either telephone facsimile or telephone) within 2 working days. This notification will include the name, grade, address or duty location, and phone number of the complainant; a synopsis of the specific allegation(s); any supporting data received by the IG; the name, grade, address, and phone number of the IG action officer; and any other information required during notification in accordance with DOD Instruction 6490.4.

(3) All allegations of improper referral for MHE must be analyzed for reprisal under the provisions of 10 USC 1034. If, as a result of initial review by DAIG, possible violation of DODD 7050.6 (Military Whistleblower Protection) cannot be ruled out, then DAIG will refer the allegations to the appropriate MACOM IG for IGAP (see c(4) above).

8-10. Coordination and cooperation

Coordination and cooperation among the OTIG; Security, Force Protection, and Law Enforcement Division (DAMO-ODL); Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS); and the USACIDC are governed by various directives and authority. (A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) among the above parties, dated 24 March 1988, and modified by a MOU addendum dated 7 July 1992, expresses this coordination and cooperation.)

a. Concept.

(1) Applicable directives and regulations prescribe functions, authority, procedures, techniques, and scope of investigations by IGs, provost marshals or security officers, and USACIDC personnel.

(2) Inspector general investigations are aimed primarily at the collection and assessment of command, management, or leadership concerns as well as breaches of military professional ethics.

(3) USACIDC and MP investigations focus on criminal activity.

(4) Management weaknesses or systemic deficiencies may create a climate for crime or be the result of crime. Therefore, the same Army activity may necessitate both IG and law enforcement investigations.

b. Policy.

(1) TIG; the DCSOPS; the Commander, USACIDC; and their designated representatives mutually agree to a transfer

of essential information on a close-hold basis concerning major or sensitive investigations being conducted within their respective primary areas of responsibility.

(2) This policy will be followed at all levels. Exceptions can be those cases in which transfer of information is restricted by the SA or the CSA.

c. Procedures.

(1) Coordination among IGs, USACIDC, and the Provost Marshal should be accomplished at the following levels:

(a) Among OTIG, HQ of USACIDC, and ODCSOPS.

(b) Among MACOM IGs, provost marshals or security officers, and counterpart USACIDC elements.

(2) Transfer of investigative responsibility at any level will be accomplished with the knowledge of the appropriate commander or chief of staff.

(3) Once any party referred to in *b* above has started an investigation (or has been directed to start an investigation), based upon a referral of allegations from another party to this policy, the agency conducting the investigation will provide status or close-out reports of its investigation, as appropriate, to the party that referred the allegations.

(4) Any investigative agency, with the knowledge and approval of the agency commander, may be used in support of an investigation being conducted by another. Exceptions to the procedures above follow:

(a) *Criminal.* TIG and command and State IGs will ensure that information of a criminal nature developed as a subsidiary matter during their investigation will be protected and immediately provided to USACIDC personnel, a provost marshal, or a security officer, whichever is appropriate. Inspector general ROIs/ROIIs will not be released without approval of TIG.

(b) *Noncriminal.* HQ of USACIDC and commanders of USACIDC elements at all levels will ensure that non-criminal information developed during their investigations and related to the exercise of command or administration of the Army is provided to the IG, either during the USACIDC investigation or upon completion, whichever is appropriate.

(c) *Exercise of command or administration.* Security, Force Protection, and Law Enforcement Division, ODCSOPS, and provost marshals or security officers at all levels will ensure that noncriminal information developed during their investigations and related to the exercise of command or administration of the Army is provided to the IG at the appropriate level as soon as possible.

(5) The USACIDC will normally investigate those felony offenses listed in AR 195-2 and similar felony offenses under applicable laws that involve as subjects senior-level personnel (active duty or retired general or flag officers, brigadier general selectees, members of the SES or Executive Schedule personnel). Other offenses involving these personnel as subjects may be investigated by the USACIDC if the complexity of the incident so dictates.

(6) Exceptions to this division of responsibility for investigation of allegations against senior officials will be approved by TIG and the Commander, USACIDC.

(7) USACIDC will report any and all allegations against senior officials, by rapid and confidential means, to TIG within 2 working days after receipt by any USACIDC element, whether or not USACIDC exercises investigative responsibility. TIG will immediately report all allegations of misconduct by senior officials within USACIDC investigative responsibility and all allegations of fraud, regardless of investigative responsibility, to USACIDC.

Chapter 9

The Role of Inspectors General in Military Operations

9-1. Inspector general role

a. The IG System was born during conflict and had its earliest contributions in training to standard and maintaining readiness. The IG System has played a key role across the spectrum of conflict, from the Revolutionary War through Operation Desert Storm and recent peace enforcement operations throughout the world. In war, and support and stability operations (SASO), when the command is deployed, or operating as a split command in more than one location, IGs have the same role as they do in peace-extending the eyes and ears, voice and conscience of the commander. The basic IG functions do not change; however, priority of focus during military operations must be on tasks and systems that directly relate to readiness to accomplish the command's mission during phases and types of military operations.

b. All IGs, whether in the theater of operations or in a supporting theater (CONUS and OCONUS), have a major operational mission. The IG's role in military operations is not static. It will be dictated by the command's mission and the phase of the war or SASO at the time. It is imperative that IGs become involved, early on, in the commander's planning process and understand the commander's intent and concept of the operation.

(1) As extensions of the eyes and ears of the commander, deploying unit IGs will generally focus on high payoff issues that impact on the unit's ability to rapidly mobilize, deploy, sustain itself, or prepare for military operations, conduct operations, redeploy, and get the unit ready for the next mission or reconstitution. Traditionally, IGs have

worked issues such as unit readiness for deployment and combat, training, ammunition distribution, mail service, standards of discipline, and other soldier welfare issues.

(2) Supporting theater IGs generally will be focused on many of the same issues as deploying unit IGs. Mobilization, deployment, sustainment, preparation for combat, redeployment, and reconstitution will all be issues of major concern. Traditionally, supporting IGs have played major roles in mobilization, training and readiness assessments, certifications, deployment and redeployment operations, and reconstitution.

(3) Both deployed and supporting IGs will continue to work soldier morale and welfare issues, family issues, civilian employee or other civilian issues and concerns, and other issues consistent with the fundamental missions of the IG System.

(4) State IGs have a unique focus during both war and SASO. They must be prepared to assist with the deployment of NG units and with those nondeploying units. State IGs must also be capable of responding to increased activity from family members of deploying and nondeploying NG units, as well as family members of personnel from all other Active Army and RC Services.

c. The IG must have an in-depth understanding and appreciation of the mission, operational situation, resources, and courses of action. This knowledge prepares the IG to answer concerns of soldiers and leaders and to more effectively and efficiently evaluate the execution of the command's mission.

d. An IG's ability to support the commander's operational contingency and deployment requirements will depend on prior planning and the IG's being an integral part of the unit's normal mission planning and exercise process. The IG must ensure that the commander and coordinating staff are familiar with and understand the IG's wartime role and the contributions the IG can make to the operational effort. This understanding must be established in peacetime through the IG's participation in training exercises with the commander and staff.

e. The IG's operational planning effort provides critical input to the IG mission essential task list (METL). Planning must incorporate flexibility, include provisions for full service operations (the ability to perform all four IG functions), and be oriented toward contingency operations in a developing theater. Planning should consider mobilization, deployment, sustainment, combat or SASO, redeployment, and reconstitution as applicable.

f. Upon activation and deployment of units, nondeploying supporting IGs must be capable of providing IG support to residual units or activities and families of deployed soldiers.

9-2. Organization

The organization of the IG office will vary, depending upon the status and location of the unit (that is, CONUS-based division or in-theater forward deployed). Considerations must be given to the need for both deployed and stay-behind capabilities in people and equipment. These considerations especially apply to dual-hatted tactical and installation IGs. The following factors may be considered in the planning process:

a. Identify proper TOE and TDA mix of personnel to retain flexibility for deploying elements while maintaining adequate resources at home station to meet supporting IG operational requirements.

b. Identify individual mobilization augmentees (IMA) and Individual Ready Reserve IG staffing needs. IMA personnel should be identified by name.

c. Determine training requirements for RC IG personnel who will be identified upon activation.

d. Consider appointing and training acting IGs to cover remote locations or dramatic increases in unit strength.

e. Determine method of coverage in the theater of operations where units may be widely dispersed. Indicate the methodology in the operation plan/operation order (OPLAN/OPORD).

f. Determine the bases of operations required at home station, staging bases, and deployed locations, to include the command posts from which the IG will operate.

9-3. Resources

a. *Equipment.* A periodic review of equipment authorization documents should be made to ensure that adequate provisions have been made (for example, tactical vehicles, tentage, camouflage netting, field telephones, tactical computers). IGMET electronic data hardware and software considerations, as well as supporting communications requirements, must be included as a part of contingency planning. Consideration must include both deploying and supporting IG requirements. IGMET connectivity is vital to the deployed IG's mission accomplishment.

b. *Personnel.* Manpower reviews of MTOEs and TDAs should be made to ensure adequate provisions have been made for workload increases to support wartime efforts. Training requirements for personnel selected to be IGs during wartime will be the same as those specified in paragraphs 2-3 and 5-4. Inspectors general must sustain their ability to perform all four IG functions in peacetime in order to conduct a full service operation when deployed.

c. *Publications.* Access to regulatory and policy standards contained in departmental and command publications is key to performing all four IG functions. Inspectors general must include this requirement in deployment and contingency planning. Some hard copy documents will be required, but access to publications through electronic connectivity or the use of electronic-base systems should also be considered.

9-4. Staff estimates

Inspectors general are essential members of the staff in all scenarios, including peacetime and wartime operations. Inspector general involvement in the military decision-making process from the receipt of the mission to the production of the order is continuous. The IG should have a clear understanding of the higher headquarters' order, the command's mission, and the commander's intent. The IG must ensure that the commander's expectations of the role and functions of the IG are addressed early in the mission analysis process. Once the IG understands the mission and the commander's intent, the IG is in a position to formulate or plan detailed mission requirements. This process should include anticipated IG actions during each phase of the operation such as mobilization, deployment, sustainment, redeployment and reconstitution.

9-5. Functions

a. Assistance. Both deployed and supporting IGs can expect increases in requests for information and assistance. Historically, assistance cases accounted for the majority of the deployed IG's workload. A thorough analysis of each phase of the operational spectrum will provide insights into the nature of requests that can be expected. Use of IG technical channels and increased flexibility will be essential to responsive support to commanders, soldiers, and other interested parties. Wherever possible, inquiries initiated outside the theater of operations should be routed to the appropriate IG for resolution. Typical requests for assistance include the following:

- (1) Early return of family members.
- (2) Emergency leave procedures.
- (3) Nonsupport of family members.
- (4) RC family support issues (ID card, health care, post exchange commissary privileges).
- (5) RC soldier entitlements.
- (6) Shipment or storage of household goods.
- (7) Family care plans.

b. Inspections. As units prepare for war, previously unscheduled inspections and unannounced inspections are often conducted. Inspectors general should be prepared to verify organizational readiness and identify mobilization issues for resolution. Generally, the commander will furnish broad guidance concerning "top issues." Inspector general issues will ultimately be determined by the unit's mission, commander's intent, and the operational environment. To be effective, the IG must include only those high payoff issues in the inspection plan that are approved by the commander. Inspectors general should use technical channels to share results of inspection trends and findings. The following represent the type and diversity of operational issues to consider—

- (1) Personnel or equipment readiness.
- (2) Processing for overseas movement.
- (3) Casualty affairs.
- (4) Mobilization or deployment operations.
- (5) Unit combat readiness or effectiveness.
- (6) Post mobilization or precombat training.
- (7) Ammunition resupply operations.
- (8) Combat feeding.
- (9) Enemy prisoners of war processing.
- (10) Graves registration.
- (11) Mail services.
- (12) Ports of debarkation processing.
- (13) Reconstitution.
- (14) Family assistance planning and execution.
- (15) Replacement system.
- (16) War trophies or contraband.
- (17) Accountability and serviceability of returning equipment.
- (18) Information management and information operations.
- (19) Operations security
- (20) Force protection and safety

c. Investigations. The IG investigation function during military operations differs little from peacetime garrison investigations. Investigations conducted while deployed are more difficult to complete because of the limited access to the commander, time and distance factors, and a generally greater reliance upon technical channel support from other IGs who may also be deployed. Records release policies for IG records such as ROIs do not change during military operations.

d. Teaching and training. Inspectors general have traditionally been the bridge that spans the gap of experience. The time-sensitive need for teaching and training soldiers, at all levels, on fundamental tasks essential to mission success is an inherent IG function. As extensions of the eyes and ears of the commander, the IG should view the teaching and

training function as a key factor in a unit's ultimate success and therefore plan its inclusion as a fundamental portion of all other IG activities. Especially important in this process is the IG's ability to rapidly acquire and understand the changing regulatory and policy standards inherent during major operations. The IG should be knowledgeable of information management operations and help to coordinate these requirements with the command information resource manager, functional proponents, and IGs operating in split locations.

e. Law of war violations. Inspectors general will receive reports of law of war violations and will process them in accordance with the provisions of DODD 5100.77, DOD Law of War Program.

9-6. Exercises

Realistic training scenarios provide an excellent tool to determine how to operate in all types of environments. As with any staff element, IGs should participate as full-fledged members of the staff in all command post exercises, field training exercises, Combat Training Center rotations, and mobilization, deployment readiness exercises. Command IGs should not be used in other non-IG capacities, such as liaison, rear command post commander, or detachment noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), during training exercises that would detract from their wartime mission. During these exercises IGs should include concurrent, split operations training involving the home station installation IG office. Inspectors general should routinely publish instructions in their organization's exercise operational plans and orders.

Chapter 10 Information Management

10-1. Inspector General Worldwide Network (IGNET)

The IGNET is an automated information network that supports IG case data collection, data analysis, communications and administrative requirements of IGs worldwide. The network consists of individual local area networks (LAN) located at IG offices, interconnected across DOD Wide Area Network (WAN) infrastructure, or across switched telephone connections (dial-up by modem).

10-2. Purpose

The purpose of the IGNET is to provide the automated network infrastructure to support inspectors general worldwide to—

a. Enable the collection, consolidation, and electronic interchange of IG case data at local site, MACOM, and DAIG using the Inspector General Action Request System (IGARS).

b. Facilitate communications between IGs and other agencies primarily by e-mail or internal Intranet World Wide Web based connectivity. In selected instances video telephony and application sharing with document collaboration is used.

c. Provide baseline office automation, administrative, and training software support through commercial off the shelf (COTS) and Government-developed software.

10-3. Inspector General Worldwide Network operations and responsibilities

a. Information Resource Management Division.

(1) *Program management.* The Chief, Information Resource Management Division (IRMD), is the Program Manager IGNET (PM IGNET) responsible for operation, maintenance, management, and security of the IGNET. PM IGNET responsibilities include preparation and submission of program budget input to the program objective memorandum (POM) process to ensure the program is adequately funded. PM IGNET maintains an IGNET architecture plan and manages configuration control of the IGNET. PM IGNET ensures IGNET compliance with Army automation policy, the Army Enterprise Architecture (AEA), compatibility with Defense Messaging System (DMS) migration, and that IGNET meets open architecture standards.

(2) *Network operations/administration.* IRMD personnel provide centralized IGNET operations and management internal to DAIG and in support of command and State IG sites. The DAIG IGNET network administrator will coordinate with the local director of information management (DOIM) responsible for providing WAN or dial-up connectivity for local IG sites on all configuration and installation of IGNET hardware and software.

(3) *Database management.* The IGNET database administrator is responsible for administration, maintenance, and management of all centralized IG databases.

(4) *Help desk.* The IRMD will maintain a technical help desk to support IGNET customers worldwide. The help desk will be manned during normal duty hours Monday through Friday (0730-1630 eastern standard time).

(5) Software maintenance.

(a) IGNET software maintenance. The PM IGNET is responsible for maintenance and modernization of IG

developed software consistent with the IGMET architecture plan. All problem reports and System Change Requests (SCR) will be submitted to the PM IGMET.

(b) *IGMET provided COTS software.* The IGMET PM will modernize/upgrade IGMET provided COTS software as required to maintain IGMET configuration and architecture.

(c) *Local unique software or locally provided COTS software.* The PM IGMET may approve the installation and use of locally provided software on IGMET servers and IGMET workstations. No software will be approved for use on the IGMET system unless it passes PM IGMET evaluation testing for compatibility. The PM IGMET will not authorize the installation of COTS software unless it is in license compliance.

(d) *Hardware maintenance.* IGMET-provided hardware covered under warranty will be serviced in accordance with warranty provisions. IGMET provided hardware that is out of warranty and has remaining life-cycle will be repaired or replaced at the discretion of the PM IGMET, based on technical and life-cycle cost considerations.

(e) *Intranet services.* The PM IGMET is responsible for maintaining and operating IG Intranet services in accordance with HQDA (SAIG-IR) guidance (contact HQDA (SAIG-IR) for further guidance regarding IGMET security).

(f) *Network security.* The PM IGMET has overall responsibility for the security of the IGMET. The IGMET security officer is responsible for ensuring that security procedures and protocols governing network operations are developed and issued; establishing procedures to control access and connectivity to the network; preparing and distributing instructions, guidance, and SOPs concerning network security; reviewing threats and vulnerabilities related to the network; reporting to the information systems security officer any suspicion of attempted or actual unauthorized entry to the network; evaluating planned changes to the network in terms of security; and for assisting with the preparation of accreditation documents for IGMET operations within DAIG.

(g) *Network connectivity.* The PM IGMET is the approval authority for IGMET site connectivity configurations. The PM IGMET will maintain configuration control and security consistent with the IGMET architecture plan. Because the local DOIM has the responsibility for installation, maintenance, and operation of the post network infrastructure, the PM IGMET will ensure that IG network connectivity configuration and installation is always coordinated with the local DOIM. To ensure architectural compatibility between IGMET and MACOM automation architectures, PM IGMET will coordinate IGMET architecture modernization with the MACOM Information Management Staff Office to make sure that IGMET connectivity supports future system configuration requirements.

b. *Command and State IG Office.*

(1) *Network operation/administration.* Each command and State IG will appoint in writing an IGMET site administrator who is responsible to perform limited system and network administration functions, as specified by HQDA (SAIG-IR). Personnel appointed as IGMET site administrators must successfully complete the IGMET Site Administrator Class. Coordination for class dates should be made with DAIG Training Division.

(2) *Database management.* The local IGMET site administrator is responsible for maintaining all local IG databases as prescribed by HQDA (SAIG-IR). Contact HQDA (SAIG-IR) for further guidance.

(3) *User assistance.* The local IGMET site administrator is the first line in providing IGMET user assistance. When a problem cannot be resolved by the local site administrator, it should be referred to the IGMET Help Desk.

(4) *Software maintenance.* The local IGMET site administrator is responsible for maintaining software accountability. The site administrator will install software upgrades and patches as directed by the PM IGMET. Before installing any locally obtained or developed software, the site administrator will coordinate for PM IGMET approval to ensure configuration compatibility and standards compliance.

(5) *Hardware maintenance.* The local IGMET site administrator is responsible for coordinating hardware maintenance. Hardware used in the IG office may be PM IGMET and/or locally provided automation equipment. In all cases, when the hardware is in-warranty, they should coordinate directly with the warranty service provider in accordance with provisions of the warranty. When hardware is no longer in warranty and is not covered under command-wide tier III or other local maintenance contracts, the site administrator will coordinate with the IGMET Help Desk for support. When there are command-wide tier III maintenance support contracts or local DOIM installation-wide maintenance contracts in effect, the site administrator will coordinate with the local DOIM as appropriate. Site administrators should obtain diagnostic support by contacting their local DOIM or the IGMET help desk.

(6) *Intranet services.* Inspectors general may establish an Intranet homepage on the IRMD maintained Intranet server to share information with other IGs (contact HQDA (SAIG-IR) for further guidance). Inspectors general can also establish a separate homepage on a command or DOIM maintained World Wide Web server to provide common use unrestricted information. Command and State IGs will not implement a separate World Wide Web server on any IGMET server or user workstation.

(7) *Information Management Plan.* The local site administrator will prepare an annual Information Management Plan (IMP). This plan will include current configuration information for all hardware, software, and peripherals. It should include projected modernization requirements and initiatives. It should reflect projected changes anticipated in manning that would impact equipment and software requirements. The document is intended to be a working document and tool to ensure that the automation needs of the local IG office are articulated and coordinated with both the local DOIM and with PM IGMET. Information provided in the IMP is to be used by both the local DOIM and PM IGMET for budgetary and support planning purposes.

c. DOIM.

(1) The DOIM is responsible for providing and supporting the installation-wide network infrastructure to which IGMNET connects. This includes the physical network cable wiring. The DOIM is not responsible to provide the IGMNET unique router, hubs, or modems. For the purpose of this chapter, DOIM is used inclusively for the functionally responsible office that provides DOIM-like services and management. For example, not all installations/agencies have DOIMs but may have an Information Management Directorate (IMD), G6-IR, and so forth instead.

(2) The DOIM is responsible for reviewing and commenting on the IG Information Management Plan (IMP) before it is submitted to the PM IGMNET to ensure that the local site is not requesting incompatible hardware or software that is incompatible or damaging to the installation network infrastructure.

(3) The DOIM must coordinate with the PM IGMNET whenever the DOIM makes changes to the installation network infrastructure, operating system or hardware that affect the connectivity or functionality of IGMNET systems.

10-4. Security

a. The protection of sensitive IG data processed on the IGMNET is essential to the integrity of the IG system. The security of IGMNET includes physical security of automatic data processing (ADP) equipment, data security, and information security. The IGMNET architecture is designed conceptually to use common communications channels whenever possible. WAN connectivity across installation networks requires that specific IGMNET hardware and software implementation be coordinated with the local supporting DOIM, to ensure protection of IG data while allowing full IGMNET WAN functionality.

b. Physical security is mainly concerned with ensuring that—

(1) Servers and computers that process or store IG data are physically secured within IG offices or in IG access controlled machine room space or equipment closets.

(2) Access to IG software, hardware, data, and information is limited to IGs or to personnel supervised by IGs. This does not preclude performance of hardware or software warranty or support maintenance. When non-IG personnel perform such maintenance, it will be under observation of IG personnel.

(3) WAN connectivity will be accomplished by connection of the IG LAN to the installation LAN through a PM IGMNET provided and configured router. All IG servers and workstations will be isolated on a LAN segment that is behind the IG router. The PM IGMNET may also coordinate the installation of additional security measures such as firewall software and encryption hardware/software as necessary to meet specific site or IGMNET requirements. PM IGMNET retains exclusive configuration control of IGMNET provided routers or other IGMNET security devices. Implementation of the router or any other security enhancement will be coordinated with the DOIM to ensure compatibility with local network infrastructure. Local DOIMs may introduce additional security systems to protect installation network infrastructure but must ensure that IGMNET connectivity is not blocked. PM IGMNET and the local DOIM will coordinate feasible configurations and technical implementations to ensure that IGMNET functionality or security is not compromised.

(4) Many installation networks are migrating to V-LAN or like technologies. These emerging technologies provide significant operational benefits to the local DOIM in allowing centralized LAN management, maintenance, and security. They also introduce internal operational security concerns regarding potential non-IG access to IG data. When IGMNET WAN connectivity must operate across a V-LAN, the DOIM and PM IGMNET will coordinate and approve a configuration and procedures to ensure security of IG data and information.

(5) IGMNET sites that require dial-up connectivity due to the unavailability of WAN connectivity will be configured by the PM IGMNET with coordination for appropriate switched telephone lines made with the supporting DOIM.

(6) Facsimile modems will not be installed in IGMNET servers or workstations without a PM IGMNET approved configuration and implementation. Unapproved installations of facsimile modems create possible backdoor entry points for intrusion into IGMNET and installation networks.

c. Data and information security considerations follow.

(1) AR 380-5 and AR 380-19 are the governing regulations for security (contact HQDA (SAIG-IR) for additional IGMNET operational security guidance).

(2) Only IG offices will have access to the IGMNET system. Only designated IG personnel within these offices will be allowed access to IG automated records or data.

(3) Access to IG software, hardware, data, and information is limited to IGs or to personnel supervised by IGs. This does not preclude performance of hardware or software warranty or support maintenance. When non-IG personnel perform such maintenance, it will be under observation of IG personnel.

(4) The IGMNET is an accredited FOUO system that processes Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information. Its level of criticality is Group III—Mission Impaired. TIG is the Designated Approving Authority for IGMNET accreditation. The Certifying Official for IGMNET accreditation is the Chief, SAIG Information Resource Management Division. Each field site IG office is responsible to ensure that IGMNET configuration meets or exceeds the minimum accreditation standards contained in the generic configuration of the IGMNET accreditation plan. Field site inspectors general are responsible to coordinate local operational accreditation with their supporting DOIM or other responsible authority for any accredited network adjoining the IGMNET at its accreditation boundary.

(5) Classified data will not be entered into IGMNET, except at sites accredited for classified data.

(6) Inspectors general will ensure that IG data stored in portable computers is afforded the same confidentiality and protection as other IG records.

(7) All magnetic data storage media containing IG data will be handled in accordance with the IGMNET security procedures whenever they are replaced, repaired or disposed (contact HQDA (SAIG-IR) for further guidance).

10-5. Enhancements

a. Inspectors general will not change IGMNET hardware or software configurations without PM IGMNET approval. This includes the introduction of command unique or COTS software that might be incompatible with or damaging to the IGMNET system. When approved, all non-IGMNET software must be maintained in accordance with its appropriate license provisions.

b. Inspectors general will include additional hardware and software requirements to meet IG mission need in their Information Management Plan, (IMP). They will provide a copy of the IMP through their supporting DOIM for review and comment to ensure compatibility with installation architectural migration and then to PM IGMNET. Inspectors general will coordinate implementation of IG IMP initiatives with PM IGMNET and the supporting DOIM before implementation.

c. Inspectors general are encouraged to coordinate with their supporting DOIMs to avail themselves of work station modernization opportunities consistent with DOIM ADP architecture initiatives. When the local DOIM provides modernized workstations to an IG office, PM IGMNET will upgrade and redistribute the legacy IGMNET provided platform within IGMNET, or transfer the legacy workstation to the supporting station as appropriate within prudent and economical life-cycle management. PM IGMNET will assume post warranty maintenance of DOIM provided workstations required to support IG mission functions when tier III or local maintenance contracts are not available.

Chapter 11

Department of Defense Inspector General Semiannual Report to the Congress

11-1. Semiannual report requirements

TIG is required by 5 USC App. 3, section 5, to submit semiannual reports to the IG, DOD summarizing the significant activities of auditors, investigators, inspectors, and their efforts to curb fraud, waste, and mismanagement. Semiannual reports are submitted to IG, DOD not later than 15 April and 15 October for the 6-month periods ending 28 February and 31 August (with the exception of the U.S. Army Audit Agency, which uses cutoff dates of 31 March and 30 September). TIG is responsible for developing the inspection information for the Army and consolidating information from the following organizations:

- a. The Auditor General submits internal audit (USAAA) information.
- b. The MACOM IGs submit inspection information.
- c. The Commander, USACIDC submits investigative information.

11-2. Investigations (provided by U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command)

a. Provide up to three brief synopses of the most significant fraud and crime prevention surveys or significant crime analysis reports completed during the period. Clearly indicate how each survey or report had a significant affect on operations or management.

b. Provide summaries of fraud cases in which an indictment, conviction, or significant resolution (for example, substantial sentencing, recovery, or settlement in a case for which an indictment was previously reported) occurred during the reporting period. The summary for each case will include the names of the subjects, the case file number, a brief description of the fraud schemes, and criminal, civil, contractual, administrative, or other disposition of the investigation as it relates to each subject.

c. TIG will provide a courtesy copy of the summaries to the IG, DOD, by 10 April or 10 October.

Appendix A References

Section I Required Publications

AR 1-201

Army Inspection Policy. (Cited in paras 1-9c, 6-2b, 6-2b(3), and 6-4a(6).)

AR 36-2

Audit Reports and Followup. (Cited in para 1-4a(15)(b).)

AR 381-10

US Army Intelligence Activities. (Cited in paras 1-4a(13), 1-4b(8), 1-4b(8)(a), 6-9b, 6-10a, 6-10c, 6-10d(2), 6-11a, 6-11a(3), 6-11a(4), 6-11a(5), and 6-11b(6).)

Section II Related Publications

A related publication is a source of additional information. The user does not have to read a related publication to understand this regulation.

AR 1-20

Legislative Liaison

AR 10-5

Headquarters, Department of the Army

AR 10-87

Major Army Commands in the Continental United States

AR 11-2

Management Control

AR 11-7

Internal Review and Audit Compliance Program

AR 15-6

Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers

AR 15-180

Army Discharge Review Board

AR 15-185

Army Board for Correction of Military Records

AR 25-55

The Department of the Army Freedom of Information Act Program

AR 25-400-2

The Modern Army Recordkeeping System (MARKS)

AR 27-1

Judge Advocate Legal Services

AR 27-10

Military Justice

AR 27-20

Claims

AR 27-40

Litigation

AR 50-5

Nuclear Surety

AR 50-6

Chemical Surety

AR 50-7

Army Reactor Program

AR 71-32

Force Development and Documentation—Consolidated Policies

AR 140-10

Assignments, Attachments, Details, and Transfers

AR 190-54

Security of Nuclear Reactors and Special Nuclear Materials

AR 190-59

Chemical Agent Security Program

AR 195-2

Criminal Investigation Activities

AR 340-21

The Army Privacy Program

AR 350-41

Training in Units

AR 380-5

Department of the Army Information Security Program

AR 380-19

Information Systems Security

AR 380-381

Special Access Programs (SAPs)

AR 385-10

The Army Safety Program

AR 385-61

The Army Chemical Agent Safety Program

AR 530-1

Operations Security (OPSEC)

AR 570-4

Manpower Management

AR 600-8-19

Enlisted Promotions and Reductions

AR 600-8-24

Officer Transfers and Discharges

AR 600-8-29
Officer Promotions

AR 600-8-104
Military Personnel Information Management/Records

AR 600-9
The Army Weight Control Program

AR 600-15
Indebtedness of Military Personnel

AR 600-20
Army Command Policy

AR 600-37
Unfavorable Information

AR 600-85
Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP)

AR 601-10
Management and Mobilization of Retired Soldiers of the Army

AR 608-99
Family Support, Child Custody, and Paternity

AR 614-30
Overseas Service

AR 614-100
Officers Assignment Policies, Details and Transfers

AR 614-200
Enlisted Assignments and Utilization Management

AR 623-105
Officer Evaluation Reporting System

AR 623-205
Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Reporting System

AR 635-200
Enlisted Personnel

AR 670-1
Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia

AR 690-600
Equal Employment Opportunity Discrimination Complaints

AR 690-700
Personnel Relations and Services (General)

AR 735-5
Policies and Procedures for Property Accountability

Assistance Guide

Copies may be obtained by writing to The Inspector General (ATTN: SAIG-TR), 1700 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-1700.